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1 Introduction
Proﬁtable investment by a pioneering ﬁrm often breeds imitation by subsequent entrants. When
developing an invention into a commercial product requires signiﬁcant enough resources so that
only a few ﬁrms may jockey to secure positions in an industry either as a ﬁrst-mover or as a
second entrant, product development takes the form of a noncooperative timing game. This
paper develops a theoretical framework for strategic investment that highlights the central role
played by the relative cost of imitation. In this framework ﬁrst and second mover advantage
are parsimoniously parametrized, and strategic interaction ranges from a war of attrition to a
preemption race. In practice, the ease of imitation depends on natural entry barriers but is also
determined by ﬁrms and regulators, through their choices of technology, licensing, and intellectual
property protection levels.1 It then seems natural to inquire which of the two regimes is preferable
from the standpoint of an industry or a regulator: preemption or attrition? Our paper provides a
number of novel welfare results that aim to shed light on this question.
1.1 Results
First, we characterize the eﬀect of varying imitation cost on strategic competition. A low imitation
cost leads to delayed product introduction as ﬁrms seek to enter second, a situation of attrition,
whereas conversely a higher imitation cost is associated with accelerated product introduction,
a case of preemption. Equilibrium in ﬁrm entry encompasses standard attrition and preemption
but can also involve a gap in the support of mixed strategies. Preemption is more likely when
product market competition is more intense whereas attrition is more likely when discounting is
less important, as occurs when volatility is high.
Firms are taken to be ex-ante identical and their roles as innovator or imitator are endogenous,
so that positional rents are dissipated both in attrition and in preemption. We are therefore able
to identify the optimal level of imitation cost for ﬁrms, which is that cost of imitation at which
there is neither a race to preempt nor a war of attrition, i.e. at which ﬁrms do not compete
for positional rents by rushing to enter or waiting unduly to innovate. The intuition behind this
result runs as follows. When imitation cost increases, a follower ﬁrm delays entry and has a lower
expected value, whereas a leader ﬁrm beneﬁts from a longer monopoly phase, and has a higher
expected value. In a preemption race, rent equalization pegs expected value to the follower value
1Mansﬁeld et al. [26] and Mansﬁeld [25] are pioneering empirical studies that have ﬁxed the perception of
imitation upon which much subsequent theoretical work is based. See also Cohen et al. [8].
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and thus decreases with imitation cost, while in a war of attrition the expected value of ﬁrms is
that of the leader ﬁrm and increases with imitation cost.
We examine the welfare trade-oﬀs associated with raising imitation cost, as may arise in the
context of a regulator's choice of broader patent protection. There is a positive lower bound for the
optimal level of imitation cost, implying that free innovation is always socially costly. Otherwise,
the social welfare function generally has two local maxima, so that for instance attrition is optimal
if a monopoly innovator practices ﬁrst-degree price discrimination and preemption is optimal if
there is product market collusion under duopoly. When preemption is socially optimal, we show
that with suﬃcient discounting the imitation cost instrument is of limited reach so the regulator's
optimum is a corner solution leading to a monopolized industry. Finally, assuming that product
market competition is characterized by a business-stealing eﬀect, we obtain a tractable upper
bound on the welfare maximum in the attrition range, and thus derive conditions under which
preemption is socially optimal.
Finally, we extend our model in several directions by incorporating a broader set of ﬁrm
decisions. First we endogenize the cost of imitation by allowing the innovator to make reverse
engineering of its product more diﬃcult or to pursue patent protection more aggressively. We
ﬁnd that the lower the natural cost of imitation, the greater the eﬀort exerted by innovators to
raise entry barriers. In addition, we allow for contracting between innovator and imitator that
can take the form either of a buyout or of a license agreement. With the former, attrition may
disappear entirely as an equilibrium if discounting is suﬃciently large. With the latter, licensing
increases welfare if the eﬃciency eﬀect is present, whereas if there is suﬃcient product market
complementarity the innovator may choose to privately subsidize imitation.
1.2 Related literature
Our model of innovation and imitation builds upon an already rich literature dating back to Rein-
ganum [30], who provides a foundation for dynamic game-theoretic models of duopoly investment
that she construes as technology adoption. In a deterministic environment in which one of the
ﬁrms can commit as a ﬁrst investor, she identiﬁes a diﬀusion equilibrium in which investments
occur sequentially and result in a ﬁrst-mover advantage. Fudenberg and Tirole [13] consider in-
vestment decisions when leader and follower roles are endogenous. With symmetric ﬁrms, there
is a preemption race that accelerates the ﬁrst investment, dissipating rents to the ﬁrst investor so
that ﬁrm values are equalized in equilibrium. In an otherwise similar framework but with asym-
metric ﬁrms, Katz and Shapiro [22] allow either licensing or imitation to occur post-investment.
3
They ﬁnd that a second-mover advantage can arise, so that investment decisions take the form
either of a preemption race or of a waiting game.
Some recent research on innovation dynamics has focused on informational spillovers, which are
one of the important determinants of second-mover advantage, into models of duopoly investment.
A key reference is Hoppe [20] which introduces uncertainty regarding the success of new technology
adoption. The follower ﬁrm only invests if the new technology is proﬁtable, so that when the
likelihood of success is low, ﬁrms engage in a war of attrition. In a similar vein, Huisman and
Kort [21] allow the follower to beneﬁt from the subsequent arrival of a better technology, and
Femminis and Martini [12] model a disclosure lag of random duration before the follower beneﬁts
from a spillover. The eﬀect of informational spillovers on investment incentives has also been
studied in models of learning by Décamps and Mariotti [9] and Thijssen et al. [35]. In these
models, the ﬁrst-mover's investment sends a proﬁtability signal to the follower in addition to some
ongoing background information that both ﬁrms receive. Depending on the relative importance
of the preemption motive and the informational externality, ﬁrms engage in either preemption or
attrition.
Through these diﬀerent contributions runs a common thread, namely that to the extent an
innovator's investment has positive spillovers for its rival, competition between otherwise sym-
metric ﬁrms takes the form either of a preemption race or of a war of attrition. We depart from
prior work by deriving a symmetric perfect equilibrium in a model of strategic investment that
incorporates both potential ﬁrst- and second-mover advantages, parametrized by the relative ﬁxed
costs of innovating and imitating ﬁrms. Thus, we relax the assumption in the so-called standard
real option game framework2 that leader and follower investment costs are identical and exoge-
nous. Some closely related work that we have identiﬁed in this area are Pawlina and Kort [29] and
Mason and Weeds [27], which introduce ﬁrm asymmetry into duopoly investment games in ways
that are complementary to the approach we adopt here.
Several other strands of research provide broader context for our work. In particular, the ease
of imitation is pertinent in determining optimum patents, as described by Gallini [15] from whom
we follow the formal speciﬁcation of the cost of inventing around. The dynamics of patent races
can be studied with similar tools to the strategic investment research cited above, as in Weeds
[38], although such applications more closely describe the invention stage of innovation whereas our
2Azevedo and Paxson [3] is a recent survey of this ﬁeld, which draws from game theory and continuous time
ﬁnance in order to incorporate strategic and payoﬀ uncertainty into models of investment. Typical applications are
to capacity investment, as in Boyer et al. [6], as well as investment in R&D, as in the present paper. For a thorough
and pedagogical presentation, see Chevalier-Roignant and Trigeorgis [7].
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focus is on the subsequent development or product introduction phase. Another stream of research
dating back to Benoit [4] studies imitation incentives once an innovator has achieved incumbency.
More recent papers such as Mukherjee and Pennings [28] and Henry and Ruiz-Aliseda [19] have
identiﬁed the importance of the patenting, licensing, and reverse engineering decisions that then
arise. Our analysis is also related to models of cumulative innovation, as exempliﬁed by Green and
Scotchmer [16] and Denicolò [10] although our focus is on ﬁrms that are horizontal competitors
rather than the distribution of rents between basic and applied research.
1.3 An example: imitation cost in the biopharmaceutical industry
The questions we address were originally motivated by real-world situations in which the same
ﬁrms can face contrasting technological conditions with respect to ease of imitation over the
diﬀerent business segments in which they operate. In the biopharmaceutical industry, typically,
whereas medications are easily imitated thus justifying the industry's systematic recourse to patent
protection, in the vaccine segment technological conditions render imitation much more costly.3
On the one hand, pharmaceutical ﬁrms typically rely on intellectual property rights in order
to increase the costs of imitators for new drugs which otherwise could be copied more easily than
products whose production processes can be kept secret, or for which the time and relative expense
needed to copy the invention are much higher (Scherer and Watal [32], p. 4). If such patent
protection is not available, a generic product can be introduced at a much lower ﬁxed cost than
incurred by the branded product supplier. In India, after the passage of the Patents Act 1970, and
before the TRIPs (Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property rights) agreements were enforced,
pharmaceutical products became unpatentable, allowing innovations patented elsewhere to be
freely copied (Lanjouw [23], p. 3). By reducing imitation costs, the absence of legal protection
fostered the domestic production of generic formulations.
This ease of imitation is not found in the vaccine segment, as vaccines are made from living
micro-organisms, and unlike drugs are not easily reverse-engineered, as the greatest challenges
often lie in details of production processes that cannot be inferred from the ﬁnal product, im-
plying that there is technically no such thing as a generic vaccine (Wilson [37], p. 13). The
regulatory implication is that a me-too vaccine supplier must pay for clinical trials to demonstrate
the safety and eﬃcacy of its product. There is no short-cut toward the bio-equivalence of a copied
3Another characteristic of the pharmaceutical industry is the uncertainty that is introduced by late-stage clinical
trials regarding the outcome of an R&D project, most often after signiﬁcant costs have already been sunk, but we
do not seek to represent this speciﬁc feature in our model.
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candidate vaccine, whose design and delivery require investments in technological capabilities and
manufacturing facilities that comply with demanding regulatory standards. In the case of recent
complex vaccines (e.g., a tetravalent dengue virus vaccine), a follower must catch up with leading-
edge R&D and manufacturing approaches (the technological challenges for the design a dengue
virus vaccine are reviewed in Guey Chuen et al. [17]). The ﬁxed cost that must be incurred by a
new entrant for the delivery of a follow-on vaccine can thus be prohibitively high.4
2 A model of new product development
This section describes a model of strategic investment in line with the characteristic features of
innovation and imitation identiﬁed above. The assumptions regarding industry structure and ﬁrm
conduct are presented in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, and equilibrium in Section 2.3.
2.1 Assumptions
Two otherwise identical ﬁrms may enter a new market by introducing their own version of a
product. Product development involves uncertainty regarding future levels of ﬁnal demand and
irreversibility, as in the investment framework described by Dixit and Pindyck [11]. Organizational
constraints preclude a ﬁrm from selling two variants of the product.
The introduction of the product generates a perpetual proﬁt ﬂow whose instantaneous value
depends on the number of active ﬁrms: piM when a single ﬁrm is active, and piD when both are.
These ﬂow proﬁt levels may reﬂect either standard duopoly competition (0 < 2piD ≤ piM ) or
duopoly competition with product complementarity (piM ≤ 2piD ≤ 2piM ). Flow proﬁt is scaled
by a multiplicative shock (Yt) representing market size that follows a geometric Brownian motion
(dYt = αYtdt+ σYtdZt where (Zt)t≥0 is a standard Wiener process), so as to reﬂect the idea that
demand for a new product is typically uncertain but growing over time. Proﬁt ﬂows are assumed
to begin instantaneously and with certainty once investment has occurred.5 Firms have a common
and constant discount rate (r).
Introducing the new product involves an irrecuperable ﬁxed cost (I) for the the ﬁrst ﬁrm that
invests, i.e. for the innovator. A ﬁrm that observes its rival's innovation can invest after, even
4We further discuss this example in light of the theoretical model in Section 4.1.
5Thus, we do not purport to model lead times, and our approach contrasts with some of the related work on
patent races or information spillovers cited above, in which the success of innovation is an additional stochastic
element for ﬁrms. A lower cost of imitation in our model is consistent with an informational spillover, if innovation
requires success on a large number of independent trials or a search process that an imitator can bypass.
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immediately, as a second entrant, i.e. as an imitator. We assume that in addition to the various
standard setup costs associated with bringing a product to market such as dedicated plant and
equipment, marketing expenditures, and so forth, the follower incurs a cost of imitation of variable
magnitude depending on technological or institutional conditions. Introducing the alternative
version thus involves an irrecuperable ﬁxed cost (K), and we allow for the extreme case of costless
imitation. The imitator's ﬁxed cost may be either higher or lower than the innovator's, depending
both on the diﬃculty of reengineering and on the degree of protection aﬀorded to the intellectual
property of innovators. If the second ﬁrm can develop the same product independently, for ex-
ante identical ﬁrms, imitation is no more expensive than innovation (K ≤ I) in the absence of
intellectual property protection. When the complexity of the product is limited or legal protection
is weak (when the breadth of patents is narrow) the imitation costs can still be low enough that the
entry cost is lower for the follower than for the leader. On the other hand, greater technological
complexity and stronger legal protection imply a higher cost for imitators who must invest in
reverse engineering or invent around any patents held by the innovator, although this is mitigated
by disclosure requirements that reduce unnecessary duplication of eﬀort, and a product can be so
complex or legal protection can be so strong as to make the second mover incur higher entry costs
than the leader (K > I).6 Moreover, we later show that such a level of complexity legal protection
can be socially optimal (in fact, that it can even be eﬃcient to rule out the second ﬁrm's entry and
rely only upon the threat of product market competition by setting an arbitrarily high imitation
cost K∗ =∞).
Finally, we suppose that information is complete and that α ≥ 0, σ ≥ 0 (with one of these
inequalities strict), α < r, and 0 < Y0 < (r − α) I/piM ,7 so that absent competition an innovating
ﬁrm would initially prefer to delay investment and hold on to their growth option, either because
of deterministic growth in demand, or volatility, or some combination of the two.
6Our focus is the relation between innovation and imitation, but other circumstances can also lead to asymmetric
ﬁxed costs for ex-ante identical ﬁrms. If developing the new product involves scarce assets, such as prime location in
real estate or natural resource extraction, then the imitator may face a higher cost (K > I). We do not pursue this
interpretation actively. One area where doing so would make a diﬀerence is in the case of ties, where we will assume
that if both ﬁrms seek to and eﬀectively invest simultaneously, the investment cost is I, rather than max {I,K}
as would be the case if ﬁrms had to compete for scarce assets in the input market. Also, imperfect competition in
input markets may result in asymmetric investment costs. In Billette de Villemeur et al. [5], investment cost is
determined endogenously by a strategic input supplier, resulting in a discounted input price for the ﬁrst ﬁrm that
invests (I < K).
7This bound ensures that ﬁrms prefer to delay investment under preemption rather than invest immediately
even when imitation costs are large.
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2.2 Threshold strategies and leader and follower payoﬀs
Firms decide independently when to introduce a new product. In order to focus on the economic
aspects of the decision problems of the ﬁrms, we describe a reduced form market entry game that
captures the relevant features of a more general dynamic entry game. This is done by taking ﬁrm
strategies to consist of investment thresholds, which determine a stochastic time of investment,
and by imposing a speciﬁc tie-breaking rule in the event that both ﬁrms face a known coordination
problem in which they seek to invest simultaneously when it would only be optimal for one to do
so (see Section ?? for a discussion of the underlying dynamic game).
At any time t ≥ 0 at which it has not yet invested, the strategy of a ﬁrm i, i ∈ {1, 2}, consists
of an entry threshold Yi ∈ [Yt,∞) that, once reached for the ﬁrst time and from below, triggers
investment. Threshold choices result in (stochastic) investment times and endogenously determine
the role of each ﬁrm as innovator or imitator. In the case of identical thresholds (Y1 = Y2), a tie-
breaking rule that is consistent with the equilibrium of the underlying continuous time game
randomly determines the roles of each ﬁrm. Under these conditions, industry dynamics in the
product market may be viewed as resulting from a two stage interaction which unfolds over time,
where in the ﬁrst stage (which determines the onset of the monopoly phase) the choices of initial
entry thresholds (Y1, Y2) determine the roles of the ﬁrms, and in the second stage (the onset of
the duopoly phase), the remaining ﬁrm enters at a threshold of its choice that we denote by Y ∗F
(with Y ∗F ≥ Yi) for the moment and specify further below.
The expected payoﬀs for innovators and imitators have the following speciﬁc forms:
L (Yi, Y
∗
F ) =
(
piM
r − αYi − I
)(
Yt
Yi
)β
+
piD − piM
r − α Y
∗
F
(
Yt
Y ∗F
)β
(innovator payoﬀ) (1)
and
F (Yi;K) =
(
piD
r − αYi −K
)(
Yt
Yi
)β
(imitator payoﬀ) (2)
where in both (1) and (2), β is shorthand for the function of parameters
β (α, σ, r) :=
1
2
− α
σ2
+
√(
1
2
− α
σ2
)2
+
2r
σ2
. (3)
The function β given in (3) is a standard expression in real option models, satisfying β > 1
and limσ→0 β = r/α. A lower value of β is associated with a greater incentive to wait (it is
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straightforward to check that ∂β/∂α < 0, ∂β/∂σ < 0, and ∂β/∂r > 0), so β may be interpreted
as a measure of impatience. The (Yt/·)β terms in which β occurs reﬂect the expected discounting
of the monetary units that are received when the stochastic process reaches the relevant thresholds
for the ﬁrst time.8
The leader (innovator) payoﬀ is comprised of two terms, which correspond to the monopoly
proﬁt ﬂow of the innovating ﬁrm and the negative impact on this proﬁt ﬂow of the second
ﬁrm's entry. The follower (imitator) payoﬀ has the standard form of a growth option. Both
payoﬀ functions are quasiconcave over their domains and attain non-negative global maxima at
YL := (β (r − α) I) / ((β − 1)piM ) and YF := max {Yt, (β (r − α)K) / ((β − 1)piD)} respectively.
We refer to these thresholds as the optimal standalone leader and follower thresholds, and the pair
of strategies {YL, YF } corresponds to the open loop equilibrium identiﬁed by Reinganum [30].9
A key property of the payoﬀ functions which is used throughout our analysis is that the leader
payoﬀ is nondecreasing in the imitation cost provided the follower invests at the optimal follower
threshold (∂L (Yi, Y
∗
F ) /∂K ≥ 0), whereas the follower payoﬀ is decreasing in the imitation cost
(∂F (Yi;K) /∂K < 0).
Lastly, both ﬁrms may introduce their respective products independently at the same moment,
in which case we assume that they incur the same ﬁxed cost. The corresponding payoﬀ is denoted
by M (Yi) := L (Yi, Yi) (= F (Yi; I)), which is maximized at YS := (β (r − α) I) / ((β − 1)piD).
2.3 Equilibrium
We choose to focus on symmetric equilibrium. One reason for this is that as ﬁrms are taken to
be symmetric ex-ante, it seems natural to suppose that they hold symmetric beliefs about each
other's play at the beginning of the investment game. In so doing, the equilibrium described in
Proposition 1 below is consistent with the earlier approaches of Fudenberg and Tirole [13] and
Hendricks et al. [18].10 Another reason to focus on symmetric equilibrium is that it results in
rent dissipation, a feature that is emphasized in the early timing game literature as surveyed by
8In the deterministic case (σ = 0) and letting ti := inf {τ , Yτ ≥ Yi}, (Yt/Yi)β = exp(−r (ti − t)), which is the
standard continuous time discounting term under certainty.
9For suﬃciently low values of K (K ∈ [0,Kl), Kl := (piD/piM )I), YF < YL. In this range, if roles were
exogenously assigned, a follower would be willing to pay its rival to induce it to invest earlier. We mention this
possibility for completeness but the threshold Kl does not play a signiﬁcant role in the rest of the analysis.
10Particularly in attrition models, authors have sometimes proceeded diﬀerently. Notably, Hoppe [20] focuses on
asymmetric equilibrium in pure strategies. This approach applies if, for instance, the same entry game is played in
several independent markets and pre-play communication enables ﬁrm coordination, but we do not allow for this
possibility here.
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Fudenberg and Tirole [14], and which rationalizes a smooth dependence of equilibrium on imitation
cost that is of compelling simplicity.
The reduced form game described in Section 2.2 occurs in two stages. First, ﬁrms compete in
entry thresholds that endogenously determine their roles as innovators or imitators, and second,
at once after initial entry has occurred, the remaining ﬁrm selects its own entry threshold. We
therefore have
• Stage 1: both ﬁrms select initial entry thresholds (Y1, Y2) (or distribution thereof) that
determine innovator and imitator roles;
• Stage 2: if a single ﬁrm (i) innovates, the remaining ﬁrm (−i) then selects its imitator entry
threshold.
To determine the equilibrium choices, notice that once initial investment by at least one of the
ﬁrms has occurred, any ﬁrm that remains out of the market holds a standard growth option. It
prefers to wait if the ﬁrst investment occurs early enough (before YF is reached), and otherwise it
prefers to invest immediately. The optimal follower policy for a given ﬁrst investment threshold Yi
is therefore Y ∗F = max {Yi, YF }, resulting in the follower value F (Y ∗F ;K). By backward induction,
the ﬁrst stage leader payoﬀ is therefore L (Yi, Y
∗
F ).
In the ﬁrst stage, a given ﬁrm i's payoﬀ is thus
V (Yi, Y−i) =

L (Yi, Y
∗
F ) if Yi < Y−i
p (Yi;K)L (Yi, Y
∗
F ) + p (Yi;K)F (Y
∗
F ;K) + (1− 2p (Yi;K))M (Yi) if Yi = Y−i
F (Y ∗F ;K) if Yi > Y−i
(4)
where the second line of (4) incorporates the tie-breaking rule of the reduced form game, which
runs as follows. If at a given moment both ﬁrms seek to invest, whereas it would only be optimal
for one to do so (i.e. if F (Y ∗F ;K) > M (Yi)), then they face a known coordination problem
(Fudenberg and Tirole [13]). If coordination is successful, either ﬁrm is equally likely to invest as
a leader or as a follower, with probability
p (Yi;K) =

F(Y ∗F ;K)−M(Yi)
L(Yi,Y ∗F )+F(Y
∗
F ;K)−2M(Yi)
if L (Yi, Y
∗
F ) ≥ F (Y ∗F ;K)
0 if L (Yi, Y
∗
F ) < F (Y
∗
F ;K)
. (5)
The expression (1− 2p (Yi;K)) is the probability that mistaken simultaneous investment oc-
curs.11
11One contrast between our model and the standard real option game is that the values of the leader and follower
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Note that there are two kinds of simultaneous investment outcomes that can arise in the model.
If one ﬁrm invests ﬁrst and thereby takes the role of innovator, but does so at a suﬃciently high
threshold (Yi ≥ YF ), the remaining ﬁrm then chooses to invest immediately after, although it
takes the follower role so its payoﬀ is F (Yi;K). On the other hand, if both ﬁrms attempt to invest
simultaneously without coordinating their investments, they receive the same payoﬀ M (Yi).
In the proposition that follows, we establish that there exists a critical imitation cost, which
we denote by K̂,12 that determines the nature of the duopoly investment game. This imitation
cost is deﬁned implicitly by the condition that ﬁrms are indiﬀerent in equilibrium between the
innovator and imitator payoﬀs when these are evaluated at the optimal standalone thresholds, that
is L (YL, Y
∗
F ) = F
(
Y ∗F ; K̂
)
(note that Y ∗F is a function of K). For K ≥ K̂ so that it is well-deﬁned
in [Yt,∞), deﬁne a critical level of the multiplicative shock Yt, that we denote by YP , as the
lower root of the condition L (YP , Y
∗
F ) = F (Y
∗
F ;K). This threshold is usually referred to as the
preemption threshold, and describes the point of indiﬀerence between innovating and imitating.
Then,13
Proposition 1 The duopoly investment game has a unique symmetric equilibrium and there exists
a threshold imitation cost K̂ ≤ I such that:
(i) if the imitation cost is low (K < K̂), ﬁrms play a game of attrition. The innovator investment
threshold (Y˜I = min
{
Y˜1, Y˜2
}
) is distributed continuously over a possibly disconnected support
bounded below by the standalone leader threshold (YL), and imitator investment occurs either at
the optimal standalone follower threshold (YF ) or immediately after the innovator's entry.
(ii) if the imitation cost is intermediate (K = K̂), equilibrium innovator investment thresholds are
Y ∗1 = Y ∗2 = YL, and investments occur at the optimal standalone leader and follower thresholds
(YL, YF ).
(iii) if the imitation cost is high (K > K̂), ﬁrms play a game of preemption. Equilibrium innovator
investment thresholds are Y ∗1 = Y ∗2 = YP , and investments occur at the thresholds (YP , YF ).
payoﬀs generally diﬀer at YF because of the asymmetry in investment costs. For some values of K, the behavior of
the mistake probability 1− 2p (Yi;K) is non-monotonic (See Section ??).
12See Section A.2 for a characterization of K̂ :=
(
(1 + β ((piM/piD)− 1)) / (piM/piD)β
)1/(β−1)
I.
13Note that simultaneous innovation never occurs in this model for several reasons. In the attrition range, the
setting of identical stage 1 thresholds (Y˜1 = Y˜2) is a zero probability event, although if it ever were to happen ﬁrms
would invest simultaneously according to the tie-breaking rule. In the preemption range, ﬁrms choose identical
thresholds (Y ∗1 = Y
∗
2 ) but coordinate so that either ﬁrm invests as a leader with equiprobability.
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In order to illustrate the cases described in Proposition 1, Figures 1 − 5 depict leader and
follower payoﬀs in the ﬁrst stage of the game, for diﬀerent values of the imitation cost. Throughout
these ﬁgures, as the imitation cost increases, the follower payoﬀ shifts down and towards the
right and the optimal standalone follower threshold YF increases. Because of the longer monopoly
phase, the ﬁrst stage leader payoﬀ L (Yi, Y
∗
F ) accordingly shifts upward over the range of thresholds
(Y0, YF ) over which investments are sequential. Note that the optimal standalone leader threshold
YL is independent ofK, and the leader payoﬀ function has a kink at YF which constitutes the lower
bound of the range of thresholds over which innovator and imitator entry are simultaneous. In
Figures 1 and 2, there is a second-mover advantage (in the sense that L (YL, YF ) < F (YF ;K)) and
the game is one of attrition. Figure 3 represents the intermediate case in which the imitation cost
attains its critical value, K = K̂, and there is neither a ﬁrst-mover advantage nor a second-mover
advantage. In Figures 4 and 5, there is a ﬁrst-mover advantage (in the sense that L (YL, YF ) >
F (YF ;K)), and the game is one of preemption, with the ﬁrst investment occurring at YP .
In the symmetric equilibrium described in Proposition 1, positive rent dissipation occurs when-
ever the ﬁrms play a game of attrition (K < K̂) or of preemption (K > K̂). The expected value of
ﬁrms in equilibrium can therefore be characterized. To state the following corollary, some further
notation is necessary. Since L (Yi, Y
∗
F ) can have two local maxima, in cases of attrition in which
the imitation cost is suﬃciently low such as that illustrated in Figure 1, the global maximum may
be attained at YS := arg maxM (Yi), which then corresponds to the lower bound of the support
of innovator entry thresholds. Thus, deﬁne Y ∗L := arg maxL (Yi, Y
∗
F ) with Y
∗
L ∈ {YL, YS} to refer
to the lower bound of all the threshold distributions in attrition equilibrium.
Corollary 1 In a symmetric equilibrium, the expected payoﬀs of ﬁrms are identical and equal
to EV
(
Y˜1, Y˜2
)
= min {L (Y ∗L , Y ∗F ) , F (YF ;K)}, that is to the lowest of the diﬀusion equilibrium
payoﬀs.
The dependence of the critical threshold imitation cost K̂ on model parameters is straightfor-
ward. The next corollary gives sensitivity results with respect to the intensity of competition in
the product market (piM/piD) and discounting (β).
Corollary 2 The more intense product market competition is (piM/piD) and the more ﬁrms dis-
count the future (β), the more likely it is that preemption occurs, and conversely for attrition:
∂K̂
∂ (piM/piD)
< 0 and
∂K̂
∂β
< 0. (6)
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To provide intuition for this corollary, recall that the process Yt is stochastic and that there is
an option value for ﬁrms to wait before investing that is positively related to volatility. Provided
that there is an inherent advantage to imitation (K < I), for some parameter values and in
particular for large enough volatility (K̂ > K), this option value can outweigh any preemption
motive to secure monopoly rents. That is to say, as ∂β/∂σ < 0, by Corollary 2 an attrition regime
is more likely in industries with greater demand volatility. This particular comparative static is
important because it provides a counterweight to several of the mechanisms that are discussed
in the rest of the paper. As the next sections show, institutional conditions such as intellectual
property protection and ﬁrm choices regarding both technology and licensing generally serve to
make market entry regimes more preemptive and attrition relatively rare, unless therefore there
is a signiﬁcant enough degree of demand uncertainty.
3 Imitation cost, industry proﬁt, and welfare
The previous section highlights the key role played by the ﬁxed cost of imitation in determining
the nature of strategic competition and the equilibrium pattern of market entry. This imitation
cost is likely to be determined by several diﬀerent factors including technological conditions and
the level of intellectual property protection. It thus varies from industry to industry and can be
inﬂuenced ex-ante, most commonly upward, by regulators. Such considerations raise the question
of determining what may be desirable levels of imitation cost. At ﬁrst glance this determination
involves a simple trade-oﬀ since a higher imitation cost is socially wasteful but also hastens inno-
vator entry. However diﬀerent eﬀects arise with regard to imitator entry in the preemption and
attrition regimes that need to be examined carefully.
Two central results emerge in our model. First, social welfare generally has local maxima in
the attrition and preemption regimes. Thus, a model that focuses attention exclusively on either
attrition (second-mover advantage) or preemption (ﬁrst-mover advantage) would run the risk of
identifying only local maxima of welfare. Second, if the innovator's static entry incentive is socially
excessive, we are able to obtain an analytic condition for preemption to be socially optimal. A
useful preliminary step to conducting this more thorough welfare analysis that is of independent
interest is to ﬁrst consider industry performance only, which allows us to derive an intermediate
result regarding industry value.
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3.1 Industry performance
We begin with the relationship between imitation cost, ﬁrst and second mover advantage, and in-
dustry proﬁtability. A ﬁrst and seemingly obvious consideration that emerges from our framework
is that lower imitation cost is a necessary, but not a suﬃcient condition for second mover advan-
tage. Since K̂ ≤ I, if ﬁrms have identical ﬁxed costs, there is an inherent ﬁrst-mover advantage
that results from the monopoly phase of the entry game (L (YL, Y
∗
F ) ≥ F (Y ∗F ; I)). The degree
of ﬁrst-mover advantage in this case is determined by the relative importance of monopoly proﬁt
in the product market (piM/piD). On the other hand a second-mover advantage arises through
the input market when the relative advantage of imitation (I/K) is suﬃcient to compensate for
foregone monopoly proﬁt. Thus the empirical presence of lower costs for imitators, as has been
observed by diﬀerent authors (Mansﬁeld et al. [26], Samuelson and Scotchmer [31]), does not by
itself ensure that ﬁrms will ﬁnd it desirable to pursue so-called imitation strategies in a dynamic
setting. In the symmetric equilibrium of our model, the relationship between imitation cost and
entry thresholds runs as follows.
First, note that the higher is the imitation cost, the higher is the standalone threshold for
the follower ﬁrm (YF ), although actual follower entry may occur either at this threshold or later
if the investment game is one of attrition. The eﬀect of higher imitation cost on the innovator
entry threshold (Y˜I , YL or YP ) is qualitatively similar throughout the range of imitation costs. As
imitation cost increases, in the attrition regime it is the distribution of innovator entry thresholds
(Y˜I) that is shifted leftward whereas in the preemption regime rent equalization directly results
in a lower preemption threshold (YP ). The eﬀect of higher imitation cost on the distribution of
follower investment thresholds (Y ∗F ) does not however exhibit a simple relationship with K. In an
attrition regime, imitator entry occurs at a higher threshold as a result of an increase in imitation
cost if innovation occurs early (if Y˜I ≤ YF ) but its distribution is shifted leftward if the innovator
enters late (if Y˜I > YF ). However, the gap (and therefore the expected time lag) between leader
and follower thresholds can be shown to increase stochastically with imitation cost. To summarize,
higher imitation cost may properly be said to to accelerate innovative investment and the arrival
of imitative investment once innovation has occurred.
Lastly, the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 1 leads to a simple result regarding in-
dustry performance. Because in the diﬀerent regimes of attrition and preemption, competition
between ﬁrms to secure either second or ﬁrst mover advantages results in the dissipation of any
potential rents and since leader value increases in imitation cost whereas follower value decreases,
it is only when the level of the imitation cost is such that neither of these regimes occurs (case
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(ii), K = K̂) that investment thresholds are set optimally from the standpoint of industry proﬁt.
Thus all else equal, it is in those industries in which imitation cost approaches this level so that
ﬁrms do not have an incentive to seek positional advantages of either sort that industry value is
maximized.
Proposition 2 Viewed as a function of imitation cost expected industry value is initially constant,
single-peaked, and attains its maximum when neither attrition nor preemption occur (at K̂).
Note that Proposition 2 established there exists a threshold14 K˜ ≤ K̂ such that if K ≤ K˜, the
expected ﬁrm value EV
(
Y˜1, Y˜2
)
= M(YS) is unaﬀected by imitation cost. There is also therefore
a range of imitation cost levels
[
K˜, K̂
]
over which greater resource costs are not detrimental but
instead strictly beneﬁcial to the industry. That is to say, if ﬁxed costs are suﬃciently high to shield
an innovator from instantaneous imitation with positive probability, product introduction is more
timely and both ﬁrms beneﬁt ex-ante. Moreover, beyond its independent interest, Proposition 2 is
also instrumental in establishing our main welfare results, Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 below.
3.2 Optimal protection of innovation
We take the view that regulators can inﬂuence the relative cost of imitation, at least upward,
through their choice of intellectual property protection levels. With this single instrument, the
imitation cost K is a decision variable of the regulator, in which case it seems natural to consider a
second-best welfare benchmark in which ﬁrms are free to select their entry thresholds and product
market output or prices.
To provide some intuition for the analysis that follows, expected welfare in this model can be
broken down into three parts: expected industry value, consumer surplus from innovator entry,
and consumer surplus from imitator entry. The ﬁrst of these is maximized at the critical imitation
cost K̂ (Proposition 2) whereas the other two parts both depend on K directly as well as indirectly
through the equilibrium innovator and imitator entry thresholds. A higher imitation cost unam-
biguously accelerates innovator entry which in turn increases consumer surplus, so the second of
these welfare components is increasing in K. But the behavior of the last of the three compo-
nents of welfare is more complex in an attrition regime, since an increase in K may either delay
(through its eﬀect on the standalone threshold YF at which imitator entry occurs with positive
probability over the relevant range of K) or hasten imitator entry (if innovator entry occurs after
14See Section A.2 for a characterization of K˜ :=
(
β ((piM/piD)− 1) /
(
(piM/piD)
β − 1
))1/(β−1)
I.
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YF so imitator entry is immediate). Conceivably then, even though raising imitation cost from an
initially low level K < K̂ increases industry proﬁt and the consumer surplus from innovation, an
attrition outcome can be socially desirable if the consumer surplus from imitation weighs heavily
enough.
To formalize this intuition, consumer surplus is taken to be scaled by the market size param-
eter Yt, as is the case for ﬁrm proﬁts. Let CSM and CSD then denote the unit ﬂow of consumer
surplus under monopoly and under duopoly respectively. The social discount rate is assumed to
be identical to that of ﬁrms. Recall from Proposition 2 that equilibrium stage 1 investment thresh-
olds
{
Y˜1, Y˜2
}
are stochastic in an attrition regime, and that both the distribution of innovator
investment thresholds and the follower threshold Y ∗F are functions of K. Expected social welfare
is thus
E
Y˜1,Y˜2
W (K) = E
Y˜1,Y˜2
2V (Y˜1, Y˜2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
industry value
+
CSM
r − αY˜
−(β−1)
I Y
β
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumer surplus from innovation
+
(CSD − CSM )
r − α Y
∗−(β−1)
F Y
β
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumer surplus from imitation
 .
(7)
The ﬁrst summand in (7) is the industry value. It is independent of the distribution of Y˜I and
equal to 2 min {L (Y ∗L , Y ∗F ) , F (Y ∗F ;K)}, which is single-peaked with respect to K with a maximum
at K̂ (Proposition 2). The second term is the consumer surplus that results from innovative
investment. The expected value of this term increases with K, since a higher imitation cost shifts
the distribution of innovator entry thresholds (which may be degenerate, e.g. under preemption)
leftward. The third term is the consumer surplus that results from the imitator's entry into the
market, and encompasses opposing eﬀects in the attrition range, as discussed above. Nevertheless,
welfare in the model can be partially characterized as follows (see Section A.5 for the proof the
main steps of which are summarized below).
First, within the range of preemption regimes (K > K̂) the innovator and imitator entry
thresholds are respectively YP and YF and an explicit form for the local optimum of (7) can be
obtained. For a range of parameter values β ∈ [β0,∞), β0 > 1, this optimum is a corner solution
(KP =∞) signifying that the social planner's imitation cost instrument is of too limited a reach
to attain its welfare objective. The greatest amount of preemption that the social planner can
induce in such cases does not generate enough competition to induce ﬁrms to enter suﬃciently
early, and a single ﬁrm is active ex-post whose entry timing has been determined by the threat of
potential entry. On the other hand, if discounting is not too strong so β ∈ (1, β0) as occurs for
instance if volatility is large, KP is ﬁnite and strictly greater than K̂ so long as consumer surplus
under monopoly is positive (CSM > 0).
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Second, within the range of attrition regimes, there is a local maximum of welfare as well. By
continuity of (7), to establish its existence it is suﬃcient to show that social welfare is decreasing
to the left of the critical value K̂. For simplicity set CSM = 0 so that the middle term in (7) drops
out. Also, note that the expected industry value term E
Y˜1,Y˜2
2V
(
Y˜1, Y˜2
)
reaches a maximum
at K̂ so ∂E
Y˜1,Y˜2
V
(
Y˜1, Y˜2
)
/∂K
∣∣∣
K̂
= 0. Therefore the behavior of social welfare to the left of
K̂ is determined by the remaining consumer surplus from imitation (CSD − CSM ) term. In an
attrition regime and for the relevant values ofK (forK ∈
(
K˜, K̂
)
) this term has two distinct parts
depending on whether the innovator invests before YS (in which case imitator investment occurs
at YF ) or after (in which case imitator investment occurs immediately afterward). Accounting for
the equilibrium distribution of Y ∗F therefore gives this term as
(CSD − CSM )
r − α Y
−(β−1)
F Y
β
t
(
G∧ (YS ;K) +
∫ ∞
YS
(YF /s)
β−1 dG∧(s;K)
)
(8)
where G∧ (·;K) is the distribution of Y˜I . However, G∧
(
YS ; K̂
)
= 1 and it is straightforward to
show that ∂G∧
(
YS ; K̂
)
/∂K = 0. To the left of the critical value K̂ therefore, changes in K have a
second-order eﬀect on the distribution of entry thresholds compared with their eﬀect on YF . Thus
an envelope argument on the welfare expression (7) establishes that lim
K̂− ∂EY˜1,Y˜2W (K) /∂K < 0.
Finally, either of the local maxima (under attrition or preemption) can be a global maximum,
depending on the relative magnitude of the consumer surplus resulting from innovation and from
imitation.
Proposition 3 In a constrained social optimum, (i) there is a lower bound on the optimal imita-
tion cost (K∗ > K˜); (ii) either attrition or preemption may be socially optimal; (iii) if the social
optimum involves preemption, either one or two ﬁrms are active in the industry ex-post depend-
ing on the magnitude of the discounting term, resulting in innovation at a threshold Y ∗P = ψYL,
ψ ∈ [(β − 1) /β, 1].15
The upshot of Proposition 3 is that there does not appear to be a one size ﬁts all prescription
with respect to balancing the incentives of innovating and imitating ﬁrms, suggesting that policy
is best determined on a case by case basis according to a number of industry conditions. In line
with the discussion above two extreme cases can provide an economic intuition for part (ii) of the
proposition as follows.
15See Section A.5 for a characterization of ψ := max
{
β−1
β
,
(
CSD−CSM
piD
+ 2
β
)
/
(
CSD
piD
− β−1
β
CSM
piM
+ 2
β
)}
.
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Corollary 3 If a monopoly innovator can practice perfect price discrimination (CSM = 0) then
attrition is socially optimal. If there is either a unit demand or collusion in the product market
(CSD + 2piD = CSM + piM ) then preemption is socially optimal.
The optimal value of welfare in the preemption range has a straightforward closed form
expression but the characterization of the optimal value of welfare in the attrition range is
more complex. To obtain our second welfare result we therefore make two further restrictions.
For the remainder of this section, suppose that the static entry incentive is socially excessive
(piD ≥ (CSD + 2piD)− (CSM + piM )). To provide some motivation for this restriction, recall that
in a static setting with symmetric ﬁrms and homogeneous goods Mankiw and Whinston [24] show
that there is excess entry in an industry if total output increases whereas individual outputs de-
crease with the number of ﬁrms (the business-stealing eﬀect) and argue that these assumptions
characterize a broad range of models of oligopoly. In our dynamic setting, the main eﬀect of this
assumption is to bound the welfare associated with the imitator's entry by the expected value of
a duopoly ﬁrm, and hence (by Proposition 2), by E
Y˜1,Y˜2
V
(
Y˜1, Y˜2
)∣∣∣
K=K̂
, so as to establish the
following.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the static private entry incentive is socially excessive. Then, in a
constrained social optimum preemption is optimal if
CSM
piM
≥ Ω (β) .16 (9)
The condition (9) in Proposition 4 is satisﬁed either if there is suﬃcient discounting, as the
right-hand term is decreasing in β with lim∞Ω (β) = 0, or if demand satisﬁes a generalized
convexity property, ρ−convexity (with ρ = (1/Ω (β)) − 1) that holds for common speciﬁc forms
such as linear and constant elasticity demand function.
4 Endogenous entry barrier, buyout, and licensing
Our framework is readily extended to incorporate further real-world aspects of innovation and
imitation. One is the ability of an innovating ﬁrm to raise the entry barrier of the imitator, either
through technological choices in product development that render reverse engineering more costly
or by strengthening the patentability of its product. Another aspect is contracting between the
16See Section A.6 for a derivation of Ω (β) := (2/β)
(
(β/ (β − 1))β−1 − 1
)−1
.
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innovator and the imitator, which typically takes the form of technology transfer that reduces
the follower's imitation cost in a context similar to a licensing agreement, but can also involve a
pay for delay agreement or a buyout. From a formal standpoint these extensions both add an
intermediate stage to the investment game, once the innovator's entry has occurred and before the
imitator invests. Moreover, by raising the standalone value of the innovating ﬁrm, they tend to
favor ﬁrst-mover advantage and the emergence of preemption regimes although the implications
for imitation timing and welfare generally diﬀer.
4.1 Endogenous entry barrier
Suppose that the innovating ﬁrm may rely on a varying degree of either legal or technical protection
in order to inﬂuence the imitation cost of a subsequent entrant. In case of legal protection, the
imitation cost level reﬂects the breadth of patents, with wider patents implying higher costs
for inventing around so as to develop a non-infringing imitation. Moreover, ﬁrms may decide
to pursue patent protection more or less aggressively, as is the case for pharmaceutical ﬁrms as
discussed in Section 1.3. In case of technical protection, the imitation costs are imparted by reverse
engineering, and increase with the complexity of the copied product. For instance, an innovating
ﬁrm can expend eﬀort to render its product more diﬃcult to disassemble, or even add misleading
complexity (Samuelson and Scotchmer [31]).
Such choices may be incorporated into our model by introducing a decision by the innovating
ﬁrm at the time of its investment to expend an additional irrecuperable cost, which we denote
by ρ, that raises the imitating ﬁrm's ﬁxed cost by an amount f (ρ), where f is taken to be an
increasing and weakly concave function, with f(0) = 0 for simplicity. The cost ρ is deducted from
the innovator payoﬀ L (Yi, Y
∗
F ) deﬁned in (1). The investment costs of the innovator and imitator
are then redeﬁned as I (ρ) := I0 + ρ and K (ρ) := K0 + f (ρ), where I0 and K0 represent baseline
values where no eﬀort is exerted on raising rival cost. With respect to the sequence of decisions,
the choice of ρ arises once the roles of ﬁrms are determined, at the moment the innovator enters
and before the second ﬁrm's entry so that we have:
• Stage 1': both ﬁrms select initial entry thresholds (Y1, Y2) that determine innovator and
imitator roles;
• Stage 2': if a single ﬁrm (i) innovates, it selects a degree of patenting eﬀort and product
complexity (ρ);
• Stage 3': the remaining ﬁrm (j) then selects its imitator entry threshold.
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Proceeding by backward induction, in stage 3' the imitator payoﬀ is a nonincreasing function of
K(ρ) and therefore of the innovator's eﬀort ρ whereas its entry threshold Y ∗F (ρ) = max {Yi, YF (ρ)}
is nondecreasing. In stage 2', with an endogenous barrier to imitation an innovator that enters at
Yi has an adapted expected payoﬀ Le (Yi, ρ) and faces the decision problem maxρ Le (Yi, ρ), and
at an interior optimum the cost-raising eﬀort satisﬁes
f ′ (ρ∗)
(K0 + f (ρ∗))β
=
ββ−1
(β − 1)β
piD
piM − piD
(
r − α
piD
)β
Y −βi . (10)
The reasoning for stage 1' proceeds as in the model Section 2, save that the innovation and
imitation payoﬀs take the respective forms Le (Yi, ρ) and F (Y
∗
F (ρ
∗) ;K0 + f (ρ∗)). Whenever it is
interior (positive) the optimal choice ρ∗ results in a higher innovator payoﬀ, whereas the imitator
payoﬀ is lower: (Le (Yi, ρ) > L (Yi, Y
∗
F (0)) and F (Yi;K0 + f (ρ
∗)) < F (Yi;K0)). The equilibrium
is as characterized in Proposition 1, the main diﬀerences being that the endogenization ofK results
in more preemptive strategic investment with a lower critical threshold K̂e < K̂ separating the
preemption and attrition regimes.
The endogeneity of entry barriers has some noteworthy economic consequences. To begin with,
in those industries in which the cost of imitation is large enough so that entry competition is in the
preemption range, as equilibrium payoﬀs are decreasing in imitation cost (Proposition 2), ﬁrms
have a lower expected value than when the imitation cost is exogenous. To avoid this penalizing
outcome ﬁrms would prefer to both commit ex ante not to exert any cost-raising eﬀort in case
they happen to lead the investment process as an outcome of stage 1' (since ex post, raising the
imitation cost is a dominant strategy for the ﬁrm that happens to enter as an innovator in stage
2'). One way to achieve such a commitment is by agreeing to a common and open technological
standard.
Moreover, the ﬁrst-order condition of the innovator is informative as to the role of the baseline
cost of imitation K0. Since the left-hand side of (10) is a decreasing function that shifts downward
as K0 increases, a straightforward comparative static establishes that the eﬀort to raise the level
of entry barriers decreases with the baseline imitation cost, which it supplements (∂ρ∗/∂K0 < 0).
The latter property is in line with the biopharmaceutical industry case discussed in Section 1.3
where ﬁrms typically place greater reliance on patenting in the medications segment, in which
natural entry barriers are low than in the vaccines segment.
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4.2 Buyout and licensing
The autonomous investment incentives of innovators and imitators having been described, it is
then natural to allow for some common forms of contracting between ﬁrms. In the context of
innovation and imitation, licensing is a particularly important possibility whenever some of the
knowledge developed by the innovator can be transferred to the second ﬁrm. Other types of
contracts that can be observed include a pay-for-delay agreement or a buyout, if these are allowed
and provided that an imitator can commit not to enter the market over a certain period. Such
agreements are typically concluded by pharmaceutical ﬁrms and generic manufacturers. In this
context, a buyout in which the acquiring ﬁrm shuts down its rival may be thought of as a limiting
case of pay-for-delay.
In order to focus broadly on the eﬀects of contracting on entry timing, we do not propose to
study contracting in full generality but instead make the simplifying assumption that ﬁrms have
the ability to make a single spot transaction, which may involve a transfer either of technology
or asset ownership in exchange for a lump sum payment. This simple form of contract suﬃces to
illustrate a diversity of outcomes. We also assume that the contract is written by the innovator,
who holds all the bargaining power.
As a result, the entry game has an intermediate stage, which consists of a dynamic agency
problem in which the innovator incentivizes the imitating ﬁrm's investment behavior. Let K0
denote an incompressible level of imitation cost reﬂecting such items as distribution and mar-
keting expenses, and KI denote that part of the imitator's product development cost that can
be eliminated by a technology transfer from the innovator, so the ﬁxed cost of the imitator is
K := K0 +KI . The sequence of moves is:
• Stage 1: both ﬁrms select initial entry thresholds (Y1, Y2) that determine innovator and
imitator roles;
• Stage 2: if a single ﬁrm (i) innovates, it proposes a contract involving a transfer (ϕ) from
the innovator to the imitator (ϕ > 0 for a pay for delay or buyout, ϕ < 0 for a technology
transfer);
• Stage 3: the remaining ﬁrm (j) decides whether or not to accept the contract and selects
its entry threshold.
The reservation value of the follower if it rejects any contract with the innovator is the value
which results from the equilibrium described in the model of Section 2, F (Y ∗F ;K0 +KI). Because
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this reservation value is time-dependent until its realization at Stage 3, it is useful to denote its
Stage 2 value as F0 (Yt) and we assume without loss of generality that the contract is proposed
at the time either the innovator or the imitator enters, i.e. Yt = Yi or Yt = Y
∗
F . There are then
two cases to consider that depend on the comparative industry proﬁts in monopoly and duopoly.
(i) If the eﬃciency eﬀect is present (piM/piD ≥ 2) as occurs in many standard industrial organiza-
tion settings, if it can do so eﬀectively an innovator prefers to pay the imitator its reservation value
at the time of its entry (ϕ∗ = F0 (Yi)) in order to delay imitation indeﬁnitely (a buyout). Such an
arrangement raises the expected payoﬀ function of the leader and leaves the expected payoﬀ of the
follower unchanged, rendering a preemption regime more likely. All else equal, the magnitude of
the impact on leader payoﬀ depends on the strength of the eﬃciency eﬀect, and if it is suﬃciently
strong or volatility is high enough (if piM/piD ≥ β + 1) attrition does not occur for any level of
K. If K ≥ K̂ so that the industry is in a preemption regime, then industry proﬁts are pegged
at F0 (YF ) and unaﬀected by the possibility of buyout, whereas they are weakly higher otherwise.
The eﬀect on consumer surplus is ambiguous, as innovation occurs earlier than it otherwise would
but this must be balanced against the absence of imitator entry into the product market. Taking
two extreme examples, with perfect price discrimination under monopoly (CSM = 0) a takeover
may or may not be socially eﬃcient depending on the relative importance of additional innovator
value and lost surplus from imitation, whereas if the product market would function as a cartel
(piM/piD = 2) a buyout increases welfare only to the extent that it economizes on the ﬁxed cost of
imitation, K.
If a takeover is not allowed the best option for the innovator is to allow follower entry at
the standard threshold Y ∗F , but set its maximum license fee at this moment ϕ
∗ = KI so as to
recoup revenue from a part of the imitator's investment cost, thus reducing the duplication of
R&D eﬀorts. At the time of innovator entry, the discounted expected value of this fee reduces
the innovator's irreversible cost of investment by the expected licensing revenue KI(Yi/Y
∗
F )
β and
the leader payoﬀ in stage 1 shifts up for an unchanged payoﬀ function to the imitator, as in
the case of a takeover. As with a buyout, a consequence of licensing is a lower critical imitation
cost that separates the preemption and attrition regimes and a weakly increasing industry value.
With licensing, the eﬀect on consumer surplus is simpler. Licensing accelerates innovation under
both preemption and attrition, leaving the arrival of imitation unchanged at YF , and is therefore
unambiguously welfare improving.
(ii) If there is suﬃcient product market complementarity between ﬁrms (piM/piD < 2), imitation is
a positive externality for the industry. The optimal imitator entry threshold for the industry is then
Y ∗∗F := β (r − α)K0/ (β − 1) (2piD − piM ). It is greater than the standalone imitator threshold if
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the value of transferable technology is relatively small or if product complementarity is not too
strong (if piM/piD > 2− (K0/ (K0 +KI))) and smaller otherwise, in which case an innovator seeks
to accelerate imitator entry. If it enters early enough to have leeway and imitation would occur
too late otherwise (Yi, Y
∗∗
F < YF ), the innovator induces the industry optimum by setting a license
fee
ϕ∗ =
piD
r − αY
∗∗
F −K0 − F0 (Y ∗∗F ) (11)
and we ﬁnd ϕ∗ < KI in this case. This result is noteworthy because the innovator then subsidizes
the licensee to induce imitation at Y ∗∗F .
17 Returning to the biopharmaceutical example discussed
throughout the paper, this result oﬀers a rationalization for observed cooperation in the vaccine
industry, when a research-intensive manufacturer transfers knowledge to a local competitor in a
developing economy for a lesser payment than the investment that the technology recipient would
have made in the absence of agreement (see WHO [39]).
4.3 Synthesis
The richer set of interactions between innovating and imitating introduced in this section ﬁrms
typically raises ﬁrst-mover advantage, raising the likelihood that strategic investment dynamics
take the form of a preemption race. Where technological choices and contractual alternatives
typically have contrasting eﬀects is with respect to the timing of imitator entry, which is natu-
rally delayed when entry barriers are endogenous but which may be either accelerated or entirely
eliminated by contractual measures, so that the latter may be thought of as inducing a greater
variance in imitation outcomes. To summarize:
Proposition 5 In an extended framework for strategic investment
(i) with endogenous barriers to imitator entry, in a preemption regime ﬁrms beneﬁt from agreeing
ex-ante to a common standard; the lower the baseline cost of imitation, the higher the entry barrier
set by the innovator.
(ii) with contracting between the innovator and the imitator, if the eﬃciency eﬀect is suﬃciently
strong industry proﬁts increase with buyouts and only preemption occurs, whereas if buyouts are
ruled out licensing increases welfare; if there are signiﬁcant product market complementarities
17The use of this simple licensing instrument increases welfare since innovation and imitation occur earlier while
industry proﬁt does not decrease, but this result is not robust to other forms of licensing. If Y ∗∗F > YF and the
innovator can sign a forcing contract that is contingent on the imitator's entry threshold, imitation is optimally
delayed by licensing and the consequences for welfare are ambiguous.
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and imitation occurs late, the innovator may choose to subsidize its rival's entry in a licensing
agreement.
5 Conclusion
We have sought to develop an integrative framework so as to study some long-standing questions
regarding the allocation of resources to innovation and to imitation under imperfect competition, in
line with both established research on innovation and more recent theory on strategic investment.
In the classic work in this ﬁeld, intellectual property protection, and notably patent policy, is
motivated with reference to a trade-oﬀ between static and dynamic ineﬃciencies, as described
by Arrow [2] in a setting with monopoly and competition. The analysis of this trade-oﬀ under
imperfect competition and in a dynamic setting highlights an altogether diﬀerent channel through
which changes in the cost of imitation inﬂuence ﬁrm choices, by altering the nature of strategic
competition (attrition vs. preemption). The broad message that emerges from the study of the
duopoly case remains consistent with this seminal work  notably, that some degree of protection
should be aﬀorded to innovators when the cost of imitation is relatively small. At the same time,
alternative mechanisms such as technological choice and contracting alternatives exist that can,
to an extent, substitute for the regulatory protection of innovators so that a natural dynamic
allocation need not be less eﬃcient than a regulated one.
Among the extensions of the framework that we have identiﬁed but have not pursued here,
a possible next step in the analysis is to study incremental innovation (or versioning) among
existing ﬁrms in a market. In this setting, it is more likely that simultaneous investment equilib-
rium solutions arise, suggesting that ﬁrms might coordinate on investment timing. It is not much
further to go to examine the possibility of cooperation in product development with these tools as
well.
A Proofs
A.1 Reduced form and continuous time games
The market entry game described in Section 2.2 is a reduced form of a game in continuous time in
which ﬁrms choose (stochastic) stopping times rather than thresholds. A complete speciﬁcation
of the preemption case can be found in Thijssen et al. [36], whereas a recent wokring paper, Steg
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[33], provides a foundation the attrition case in particular. We give a summary description of
relevant aspects of the uinderlying theory here.
In a more general timing game, strategies consist at any moment t0 of a pair of functions(
Gt0i , α
t0
i
)
, the ﬁrst of which is the cumulative distribution function of a ﬁrm's future investment
times over the sample space, and the second of which is an investment intensity or atom function.
The latter allows for coordination between ﬁrms at times when simultaneous investment by both
ﬁrms is not optimal and satisﬁes a number of consistency conditions. It is such that αt0i (·) ∈ [0, 1].
At any time t at which both ﬁrms simultaneously attempt to invest, dropping time subscripts and
the argument K for simplicity, ﬁrm i's probability of investing before its rival is
p (i) =
αi (1− αj)
αi + αj − αiαj (12)
and its expected payoﬀ is
V˜i(αi, αj) = p (i)L(Y ;Y
∗
F ) + p (j)F (Y
∗
F ;K) + (1− p(i)− p(j))M(Y ). (13)
In a symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies and positive investment intensity ((αi, αj) 6= (0, 0)),
αj should be such that ﬁrm i is indiﬀerent between diﬀerent intensities, i.e. ∂V˜i/∂αi = 0 where
∂V˜i
∂αi
= αj
−αj (L(Y ;Y ∗F )−M(Y )) + (L(Y ;Y ∗F )− F (Y ∗F ;K))
(αi + αj − αiαj)2
. (14)
The sign of (14) depends on the comparison of L(Y ;Y ∗F ) with M(Y ) and F (Y
∗
F ;K). For all
Y < (=)Y ∗F , we have L(Yt;Y
∗
F ) > (=)M(Yt). Therefore, a symmetric equilibrium in mixed
strategies with positive investment intensity exists only if K > K̂ so that L(YL;Y
∗
F ) > F (Y
∗
F ;K).
Its support is then {Y ≤ YF |L(Y ;Y ∗F ) > F (Y ∗F ;K)}, with
α∗i = α
∗
j =
L(Y ;Y ∗F )− F (Y ∗F ;K)
L(Y ;Y ∗F )−M(Y )
(15)
which, given the investment probabilities (12) yields the tie-beaking rule (the investment proba-
bilities) and the reduced form payoﬀ V (Yi, Yj) in (4).
Aside from the coordination problem that arises when ﬁrms seek to invest simultaneously
another key aspect of the continuous time game with a stochastic demand shock adopted here is
that the process Yt exits the region over which attrition occurs with positive probability within
any positive time increment dt, so the equilibrium distribution over stopping times must account
for this possibility which does not arise in the reduced form game or if the stochastic process
is monotonic. Because of the relatively simple payoﬀ structure in our model (in an attrition
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regime with K ≤ K̂, the second-mover advantage is global in the sense that L(Y ;Y ∗F ) ≤ F (Y ∗F ;K)
for all Y ), the equilibrium outcomes in stopping thresholds are not altered and the equilibrium
distribution in the attrition range is given by (19) and (24) below.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
In this section we ﬁrst identify and characterize the critical threshold K̂. We then study the
innovator value function L (Yi, Y
∗
F ). Finally, we derive the equilibrium strategies in the attrition
(K < K̂) and preemption regimes (K ≥ K̂).
Characterization of K̂
Proposition 6 There exists a unique threshold that separates the attrition and preemption regimes
of the investment timing game,
K̂ =
(
1 + β ((piM/piD)− 1)
(piM/piD)
β
)1/(β−1)
I. (16)
We ﬁrst verify that K̂ is well deﬁned. If K = 0, then YF = 0 so the follower's investment in
stage 2 occurs immediately after innovation, Y ∗F = Yi. In that case
L (Yi, Y
∗
F ) =
(
piD
r − αYi − I
)(
Yt
Yi
)β
<
piD
r − αYi
(
Yt
Yi
)β
= F (Y ∗F ; 0) (17)
for all Yi ≥ Yt. For any K, any increase in imitation cost shifts L (Yi, Y ∗F ) upward since Y ∗F is
nondecreasing in K and ∂L (Yi, Y
∗
F ) /∂Y
∗
F ≥ 0. Moreover any increase in imitation cost shifts
F (Y ∗F ;K) downward since Y
∗
F maximizes F (Yi;K) and ∂F (Yi;K) /∂K < 0. At YL and YF
therefore, ∂L (YL, Y
∗
F ) /∂K ≥ 0 and ∂F (Y ∗F ;K) /∂K < 0, with limK→∞ F (Y ∗F ;K) = 0. There-
fore, there exists a unique level of the imitation cost K̂ such that L (Y ∗L , Y
∗
F ) = F
(
Y ∗F ; K̂
)
. As
L (YS , YS) = F (Y
∗
F ;K)⇔ K = I in which case L (YL, Y ∗F ) > F (Y ∗F ; I), this threshold is given by
the solution in K to L (YL, YF ) = F (YF ;K), and it is direct to verify the expression (16), as well
as the property discussed Section 3.1 of the text, K̂ ≤ I (see Section B.1 in the supplementary
section for derivations).
Characterization of L (Yi, Y
∗
F )
We next study the function L (Yi, Y
∗
F ) over [Yt,∞). There are at most two local maxima, at
YL = arg maxL (Yi, YF ) and YS = arg max M (Yi), with YL ≤ YS . For K = 0l, YF < YL so
Y ∗F = min {Yi, YF } and L (Yi, Y ∗F ) < M (YS). As argued above, any increase in imitation cost
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shifts L (Yi, Y
∗
F ) upward, whereas M (YS) is unchanged. Therefore, there exists a unique level of
the imitation cost K˜ such that L (YL, Y
∗
F ) = M (YS). This threshold is given by the solution in K
to L (YL, YF ) = M (YS), and it is direct to verify that
K˜ =
(
β ((piM/piD)− 1)
(piM/piD)
β − 1
)1/(β−1)
I. (18)
Then YL (resp. YS) is a unique global maximum of L (Yi, Y
∗
F ) if K > K˜ (resp. K < K˜).
Recall that Kl := (piD/piM ) I denotes the imitation cost such that YL = YF . Then the critical
imitation cost levels that determine diﬀerent equilibrium properties in the attrition range are
ranked as follows:
Proposition 7 The imitation cost levels
{
Kl, K˜, K̂
}
satisfy Kl ≤ K˜ ≤ K̂ with strict inequalities
if piM > piD.
(see Section B.1 for derivation).
Attrition equilibrium
For K < K̂ we have L (Yi, Y
∗
F ) < F (Y
∗
F ;K), all Yi, so ﬁrms play a waiting game. There are
two subcases to consider, i) K < K˜ and ii) K˜ ≤ K < K̂.
i) K < K˜ subcase
If K < K˜, we know from the characterization of L above that L (Yi, Y
∗
F ) has a unique global
maximum at YS and decreases over (YS ,∞). Any play in [YL, YS) is thus dominated by investing
at YS (see Figure 1). The choice of stopping thresholds by ﬁrms is therefore a standard war of
attrition with complete information over [YS ,∞). By Theorem 3 of Hendricks et al. [18] and
continuity at YS (since ∂L (YS , Y
∗
F ) /∂Yi = 0) there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which
ﬁrms randomize entry thresholds over [YS ,∞) according to the cumulative distribution
G0 (Yi;K) = 1− exp
∫ Yi
YS
M ′(s)
F (s;K)−M(s)ds (19)
and that results in an expected payoﬀ of M (YS). Substituting for the functions F and M and
integrating gives the explicit form
G0 (Yi;K) = 1−
(
Yi
YS
)β I
I−K
exp
{
−β I
I −K
(
Yi
YS
− 1
)}
. (20)
Note that as YF ≤ YS , follower entry always occurs immediately after the ﬁrst investment.
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ii) K˜ ≤ K < K̂ subcase
If K˜ ≤ K < K̂, we know from the characterization of L above that L (Yi, Y ∗F ) has a global
maximum at YL and a local maximum at YS . Because the leader payoﬀ L (Yi, Y
∗
F ) is not monotonic
over [YL, YS ] the attrition game is nonstandard. Let YS′ denote the unique solution in [YL, YF ]
to the condition L (YS′ , YF ) = M (YS). To verify that this threshold is well-deﬁned, note that
YL ≤ YF ≤ YS since Kl ≤ K˜ ≤ K < K̂ ≤ I and that L (Yi, Y ∗F ) is continuous and weakly
decreasing on [YL, YF ] (see Figure 2). To derive the equilibrium, proceed by backward induction.
First, the subgame starting at YS is a standard war of attrition, so conditionally on YS being
reached, ﬁrms randomize their entry triggers according to the distribution G0 given in (19) above.
Next, any play in (YS′ , YS) is weakly dominated by investing at YS . Therefore, the expected
payoﬀ in the subgame that begins at YS′ is M (YS) .
Lastly, consider a truncation of the game at YS′ so that ﬁrms invest over [YL, YS′ ] with a
terminal payoﬀ M (YS) if no ﬁrm has invested when YS′ is reached. This is a standard war
of attrition with complete information and by Hendricks et al. there is a unique symmetric
equilibrium in which ﬁrms randomize their entry triggers over [YL, YS′ ] with a terminal mass point
q := Pr {Yi = YS′}. Because expected payoﬀs are constant over the support of mixed strategies
which includes Yi = YL, q satisﬁes qM (YS) + (1− q)F (Y ∗F ;K) = L (YL, Y ∗F ). In the truncated
game therefore, ﬁrm randomizing entry thresholds over [YL, YS′) according to the cumulative
distribution
G (Yi;K) = 1− exp
∫ Yi
YL
∂L(s, Y ∗F )/∂Yi
F
(
Y ∗F ;K
)− L(s, Y ∗F )ds (21)
with an atom q (YS′) = (F (Y
∗
F ;K)− L (YL, Y ∗F )) / (F (Y ∗F ;K)−M (YS)) at YS′ . Evaluating the
integral in (21) and noting that Y ∗F = YF here yields
G (Yi;K) =
L (YL, YF )− L (Yi, YF )
F (YF ;K)− L (Yi, YF ) . (22)
Substituting YS′ into (22) directly establishes:
Proposition 8 The probability that there is a positive lag between innovation and imitation is18
G (YS′ ;K) =
(
(piM/piD)
β − 1
)
− β ((piM/piD)− 1) (I/K)β−1
(I/K)β−1 − 1 . (23)
18Note that for K = K˜, YL = YS′ and G
(
YS′ ; K˜
)
= 0, whereas at the other extreme G
(
YS′ ; K̂
)
= 1.
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With these elements, the symmetric equilibrium of the unconstrained attrition game over
[YL,∞) can be properly described. Note ﬁrst that if a ﬁrm were to play an atom at YS′ , the
other would strictly prefer delaying entry until YS . In a symmetric equilibrium, entry thresholds
are therefore continuously distributed over the disconnected support [YL, YS′ ] ∪ [YS ,∞). On this
support, the cumulative distribution function
G (Yi;K) =

G (Yi;K) if YL ≤ Yi ≤ YS′
G (YS′ ;K) if YS′ < Yi < YS
G (YS′ ;K) +
(
1−G (YS′ ;K)
)
G0 (Yi;K) if YS ≤ Yi
(24)
is the symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, and results in an expected payoﬀ L (YL, Y
∗
F ).
Preemption equilibrium
For K > (resp. =)K̂, L (YL, Y
∗
F ) > (resp. =)F (Y
∗
F ;K) so there exists a unique YP ∈ (Y0, YL)
(resp. YP = YL) such that L (YP , Y
∗
F ) = F (Y
∗
F ;K). We refer to preemption when the inequalities
are strict so YP < YL. Both ﬁrms seek to invest at YP , with equal probability of being an innovator
or of eﬀectively entering as an imitator at YF . The structure of the game and the arguments
establishing equilibrium are those of a standard preemption game, although two additional points
warrant mention.
If K < I, the equilibrium condition L (·, Y ∗F ) = F (Y ∗F ;K) has a root YP ′ ∈ (YL, YF ). In this
case, in contrast with standard preemption games, in a subgame where Yt > YP ′ ﬁrms play a war
of attrition resulting in an expected payoﬀ L (Yt, Y
∗
F ). As ∂L (YP ′ , Y
∗
F ) /∂Yi < 0, if Y0 ≤ YP ′ ﬁrm
prefers to enter before YP ′ and this subgame is never reached on the equilibrium path.
Second, although simultaneous investment is generally not an equilibrium in the standard new
market model of strategic investment, the suboptimality of simultaneous investment needs to be
veriﬁed here because of the diﬀerence between leader and follower investment costs. Investment
at the optimal simultaneous investment threshold YS results in a payoﬀ M (YS) and evaluating,
L (YL, Y
∗
F )
M (YS)
=
(
piM
piD
)β
− β
(
piM
piD
− 1
)(
I
K
)β−1
. (25)
This ratio is increasing in K and therefore over the preemption range for which simultaneous
equilibrium might arise, it is minimized at K̂. Substituting K̂ for K and simplifying gives
L (YL, Y
∗
F ) /M (YS) =
(
I/K̂
)(β−1) ≥ 1, with strict inequality if piM > piD. The best response
to Y−i = YS is thus YL for all K ≥ K̂. Therefore ﬁrms seek to preempt one another before the
simultaneous investment threshold is reached. 
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A.3 Proof of Corollary 2
To establish the corollary we characterize the eﬀect of β and piM/piD on K̂. Evaluating the relevant
partial derivatives and rearranging yields
∂K̂
∂ (piM/piD)
= −β
(
piM
piD
− 1
)(
1 + β
(
piM
piD
− 1
)) 2−β
β−1
(
piM
piD
) 1−2β
β−1
I (26)
so ∂K̂/∂ (piM/piD) < 0 directly,
19 whereas
∂K̂
∂β
=
−1
(β − 1)2
(
ln
1 + β ((piM/piD)− 1)
piM/piD
− (β − 1) ((piM/piD)− 1)
1 + β ((piM/piD)− 1)
)
K̂. (27)
The sign of ∂K̂/∂β < 0 is the opposite of that of the middle (bracketed) term. Applying the
logarithm inequality lnx > (x− 1) /x for x > 0, x 6= 1 with x = (1 + β ((piM/piD)− 1)) / (piM/piD)
yields
ln
1 + β ((piM/piD)− 1)
piM/piD
>
(β − 1) ((piM/piD)− 1)
1 + β ((piM/piD)− 1) (28)
which is suﬃcient to conclude. 
A.4 Section 3.1 arguments and industry optimum (Proposition 2)
Sensitivity analysis of investment thresholds
Consider ﬁrst the innovation threshold Y˜I (where Y˜I ≡ YP under preemption and Y˜I ∼ G∧ :=
1− (1−G0)2 or 1− (1−G)2 under attrition). If K < K˜ (or K = K˜), the hazard rate over ﬁrst
entry thresholds implied by (19) is
h0 (Yi;K) =
βI
I −K
(
1
YS
− 1
Yi
)
, (29)
so ∂h/∂K ≥ 0. For K˜ < K < K̂, the hazard rate corresponding to (24) is deﬁned by parts. Over
[YL, YS′) the hazard rate is
h (Yi;K) =
−∂L(Yi, Y ∗F )/∂Yi
F
(
Y ∗F ;K
)− L(Yi, Y ∗F ) (30)
where the numerator is independent of K, so ∂h/∂K = − (∂ (F − L) /∂K) (∂L/∂Yi) / (F − L)2 ≥
0. Over [YS′ ,∞) we have ∂h/∂K = ∂h0/∂K ≥ 0. The hazard rate is discontinuous at YS′ and
19Note that since K̂
∣∣∣
(piM/piD)=1
= I this establishes that K̂ ≤ I.
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YS , but as ∂YS′/∂K ≥ 0 and ∂YS/∂K = 0, it increases over the entire range [YS ,∞). Finally,
for K > K̂, YP decreases with K. Since the ﬁrst entry threshold of each ﬁrm decreases with
K (stochastically in the attrition regime and deterministically in the preemption regime), the
minimum of these Y˜I decreases as well. We have therefore established:
Proposition 9 In an attrition regime, the hazard rate over innovator entry thresholds increases
with K for all K ≤ K̂.
With respect to imitator investment, in the attrition regime the second entry threshold Y ∗F
decreases stochastically with respect to K over (YF ,∞), that is when follower entry is im-
mediate, but increases deterministically otherwise. However, the expected diﬀerence between
the ﬁrst and second entry thresholds is monotone in K. For Kl ≤ K < K̂, Y ∗F − Y˜I =
max
{
0, YF − Y˜I
}
is distributed over {0}∪[YF − YS′ , YF − YL] as Pr
{
Y ∗F − Y˜I = 0
}
= G∧ (YS ;K),
and (1−G∧ (YS ;K)) / (1−G∧ (YF − Yi;K)) otherwise. So by Proposition 9 the diﬀerence be-
tween the second and the ﬁrst entry threshold increases with K (stochastically in the attrition
range and deterministically in the preemption range).
Industry optimum
The proposition follows directly from the equilibrium values with rent equalization, that is
E
Y˜1,Y˜2
V
(
Y˜1, Y˜2
)
= min {L (Y ∗L , Y ∗F ) , F (YF ;K)}, and the sensitivity of L and F to K. Note
that for K ≤ K˜ min {L (Y ∗L , Y ∗F ) , F (YF ;K)} = M(YS) is independent of K, and that at K =
K̂, M(YS) ≤ L (YL, Y ∗F ) = F
(
YF ; K̂
)
. Therefore, E
Y˜1,Y˜2
V
(
Y˜1, Y˜2
)
is constant over
[
0, K˜
)
,
increasing over
(
K˜, K̂
)
, and decreasing over
(
K̂,∞
)
. 
A.5 Imitation cost, consumer surplus, and welfare (Proposition 3)
The argument is divided into four parts. We ﬁrst characterize the optimal imitation cost level KP
in the closure of the preemption regime (K ≥ K̂). Second, we establish that K˜ constitutes a lower
bound for any optimal imitation cost in an attrition regime (KA ≥ K˜). Third, we establish the
existence of a local optimum of welfare under attrition (K˜ ≤ KA < K̂). Finally we compare the
optimum under preemption with the optimal welfare that is attained in the attrition regime.
Socially optimal imitation cost in preemption regime
Suppose that K ≥ K̂, so entry thresholds are YP and YF . The social welfare function (7) then
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has the form
W (K) =
(
piM + CSM
r − α YP − I
)(
Yt
YP
)β
+
(
(2piD + CSD)− (piM + CSM )
r − α YF −K
)(
Yt
YF
)β
.
(31)
Noting that YP and YF are functions of K with YP ≤ YL and limK→K̂ YP = YL, and using
the preemption equilibrium condition L (YP , YF ) = F (YF ;K) which implicitly deﬁnes the ratio
(YF /YP )
β , the derivative of (31) can be expressed as
dW
dK
=
(
CSM
piM
(
β
piM
piD
YL
YL − YP − (β − 1)
YP
YL − YP
)
− βCSD
piD
− 2
)(
Yt
YF
)β
. (32)
If CSM = 0 the YL and YP terms in (32) vanish and it is straightforward to see that dW/dK < 0, so
that K̂ is a maximum. For CSM > 0, since limK→K̂ YP = YL (32) satisﬁes limK→K̂ dW/dK = +∞,
and is strictly decreasing in K over its range. So long as limK→∞ dW/dK < 0, there is a unique
root KP > K̂ that constitutes an interior optimum which occurs if(
β2
piM
piD
− (β − 1)2
)
CSM
piM
− βCSD
piD
− 2 < 0. (33)
For notational simplicity, in what follows we let KP =∞ if (33) does not hold. Taken as a function
of β the left-hand side of (33) is a quadratic function, ∆ (β), with ∆ (1) = (CSM − CSD − 2piD) /piD <
0 and lim∞∆ (β) =∞. Therefore there exists a unique β0 > 1 such that ∆ (β0) = 0. Thus,
Proposition 10 The constrained optimization problem max
K∈[K̂,∞]W (K) has a unique optimum
KP , and there exists a unique β0 > 1 such that KP is ﬁnite if and only if β < β0.
For the proof of Proposition 4 in the next section it is also useful to note the optimal value of
welfare that is realized in the preemption range. Several steps of derivations (available from the
authors, see Section B) establish that an optimum preemption threshold has the form Y ∗P = ψYL
where
ψ =

CSD−CSM
piD
+ 2
β
CSD
piD
−β−1
β
CSM
piM
+ 2
β
, β < β0
β
β−1 , β ≥ β0
(34)
We have ψ ∈
[
β−1
β , 1
]
, and from (33) ψ = (β − 1) /β if β ≥ β0. Moreover, ψ = 1 if CSM = 0.
The optimal preemption threshold is Y ∗P = ψYL, so Y
∗
P ∈ [YNPV, YL] where YNPV := (r − α) I/piM
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is the myopic Marshallian investment trigger. The optimal level of welfare under preemption can
then be shown to be
WP (KP ) =
CSM
piM
ψ1−β
1− ψ
I
β − 1
(
Yt
YL
)β
. (35)
Lower bound on socially optimal imitation cost
If K < K˜ (ﬁrst attrition subcase in Section A.2 above) so ﬁrms randomize investment trig-
gers over [YS ,∞) according to the distribution G0 (Yi;K) and imitator entry is immediate, then
W (K) < W
(
K̂
)
. To see this, note ﬁrst that by Proposition 2, industry value is lower atK than at
K̂, so it suﬃces to show that expected consumer surplus is lower also. But at K̂, innovator and imi-
tator entry occur at the standalone thresholds YL and ŶF :=
(
β (r − α) K̂
)
/ ((β − 1)piD), whereas
the lower bound of the entry threshold distribution under attrition is YS = (β (r − α) I) / ((β − 1)piD) ≥
ŶF . Therefore, both investments occur later if K < K˜ than they do at the critical imitation cost
K̂ resulting in lower consumer surplus and hence in lower welfare.
Existence of local maximum in attrition regime
Consider the value of E
Y˜1,Y˜2
W (K) just to the left of K̂. Since V
(
Y˜1, Y˜2
)
is maximized at K̂,
at this critical value the sign of lim
K→K̂− dEY˜1,Y˜2W (K) /dK depends only on the behavior of the
consumer surplus terms. For simplicity consider the third term, consumer surplus from imitation
(the argument for the other term is similar). As noted in the text the consumer surplus from
imitation is given by
CSD − CSM
r − α Y
−(β−1)
F Y
β
t
 G∧ (YS′ ;K)︸ ︷︷ ︸
lagged imitator entry
+
∫ ∞
YS
(YF /s)
β−1 dG∧(s;K)︸ ︷︷ ︸

immediate imitator entry
. (36)
To determine the value of the left derivative at K̂ of (36) recall that the distribution of en-
try thresholds is given by G∧ (Yi;K) = 1 − (1−G (Yi;K))2. Consider the ﬁrst summand in
(36). Since G
(
YS′ ; K̂
)
= 1, G∧
(
YS′ ; K̂
)
= 1. Moreover ∂G∧/∂s = 2 (1−G) (∂G/∂s) so
∂G∧ (YS′ ;K) /∂K|K̂ = 0. Therefore in (36) only the direct eﬀect of K on YF matters for welfare
at K̂. A similar argument applies to the consumer surplus from innovation term in (7), except
that there is no direct eﬀect since YL is independent of K.
Therefore,
lim
K→K̂−
dE
Y˜1,Y˜2
W (K)
dK
= − (β − 1) CSD − CSM
r − α Y
−β
F Y
β
t
∂YF
∂K
≤ 0. (37)
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SinceW (K) is continuous, we conclude that if CSD > CSM , there exists a local optimum imitation
cost level KA in
(
K˜, K̂
)
.
Global welfare optimum
We therefore know that for CSD > CSM , limK→K̂− dW (K) /dK < 0 and that for CSM > 0,
lim
K→K̂+ dW (K) /dK > 0, so that for (CSD − CSM ) CSM > 0, welfare has local maxima in both
the (upper) attrition and preemption ranges, whereas the local maximum under preemption is
KP = K̂ if CSM = 0 and KA = K̂ under attrition if CSD = CSM . Either type of local maximum
can be a global maximum depending on the relative magnitude of the consumer surplus resulting
from innovation and imitation. 
A.6 Imitation cost, consumer surplus, and welfare con't (Proposition 4)
To establish the result, an upper bound is ﬁrst derived for the level of welfare realized in the
attrition regime and then compared with a lower bound of the welfare obtained under preemption.
These bounds are tight only in the limit (β = 1), but have the advantage of resulting in a tractable
analytic condition (see (47) below).
Upper bound for welfare under attrition
The optimal value of expected welfare under attrition can be bounded above as follows. Let
Y˜I = min
{
Y˜1, Y˜2
}
and Y˜F = Y
∗
F
(
Y˜I ;K
)
denote the (stochastic) innovation and imitation thresh-
olds for a given imitation cost K. The expected social welfare under attrition (7) is
WA (K) = EY˜1,Y˜2
(
CSM + piM
r − α Y˜I − I
)(
Yt
Y˜I
)β
+E
Y˜1,Y˜2
(
(CSD + 2piD)− (CSM + piM )
r − α Y˜F −K
)(
Yt
Y˜F
)β
.
(38)
To bound the ﬁrst term, note that the integrand is quasiconcave and Y˜I ≥ YL ≥ (β (r − α) I) /((β−
1)(CSM + piM )) where the rightmost term is the global maximizer. The ﬁrst integrand in (38) is
thus decreasing in Yi over the relevant range so
E
Y˜1,Y˜2
(
CSM + piM
r − α Y˜I − I
)(
Yt
Y˜I
)β
≤
(
CSM + piM
r − α YL − I
)(
Yt
YL
)β
≤
(
β
CSM
piM
+ 1
)
I
β − 1
(
Yt
YL
)β
.
(39)
For the second term in (38), using the assumption that the static entry incentive is excessive
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((CSD + 2piD)− (CSM + piM ) ≤ piD),
E
Y˜1,Y˜2
(
(CSD + 2piD)− (CSM + piM )
r − α Y˜F −K
)(
Yt
Y˜F
)β
≤ E
Y˜1,Y˜2
(
piD
r − αY˜F −K
)(
Yt
Y˜F
)β
.
(40)
The term on the right-hand side is simply the expected follower payoﬀ in equilibrium, that is
E
Y˜−i
F
(
Y ∗F
(
Y˜−i;K
)
;K
)
= E
Y˜1,Y˜2
V
(
Y˜1, Y˜2
)
. Moreover, by Proposition 2, E
Y˜1,Y˜2
V
(
Y˜1, Y˜2
)
is
maximized for K = K̂. Therefore (40) holds if
E
Y˜1,Y˜2
(
(CSD + 2piD)− (CSM + piM )
r − α Y˜F −K
)(
Yt
Y˜F
)β
≤ K̂
β − 1
(
Yt
ŶF
)β
. (41)
Then note that ŶF =
(
K̂/I
)
(piM/piD)YL and substitute for
(
K̂/I
)1−β
(see (16)) to obtain the
equivalent condition
E
Y˜1,Y˜2
(
(CSD + 2piD)− (CSM + piM )
r − α Y˜F −K
)(
Yt
Y˜F
)β
≤ 1
1 + β
(
piM
piD
− 1
) I
β − 1
(
Yt
YL
)β
. (42)
Combining (39) and (42) yields the upper bound
WA (K) ≤
βCSM
piM
+ 1 +
1
1 + β
(
piM
piD
− 1
)
 I
β − 1
(
Yt
YL
)β
. (43)
Suﬃcient condition for preemption optimum to be global
The optimal value of expected welfare under preemption isWP (KP ) (see Section B for deriva-
tion and equation (35)):
WP (KP ) =
CSM
piM
ψ1−β
1− ψ
I
β − 1
(
Yt
YL
)β
. (44)
It is straightforward to check that taken as a function of ψ over (0, 1), ψ1−β/ (1− ψ) is strictly
convex and minimized at ψ0 := (β − 1) /β. Substituting ψ0 for ψ in (44) and simplifying thus
yields
WP (KP ) ≥ CSM
piM
I
(
β
β − 1
)β ( Yt
YL
)β
= WP (∞) . (45)
Therefore, a suﬃcient condition for the preemption optimum to be a global optimum of welfare
isWA (K) ≤WP (∞). Combining (43) and (45) and simplifying the common (I/ (β − 1)) (Yt/YL)β
terms yields the condition
β
CSM
piM
+ 1 +
1
1 + β
(
piM
piD
− 1
) < βCSM
piM
(
β
β − 1
)β−1
. (46)
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Rearranging and using 1/ (1 + β(·)) ≤ 1, a suﬃcient condition for (46) to hold is
CSM
piM
≥ 2
β
1(
β
β−1
)β−1 − 1 := Ω (β) . (47)
To characterize the right-hand side of (47), note ﬁrst that using l'Hôpital's rule, lim1
(
β
β−1
)β−1
= 1
and lim∞
(
β
β−1
)β−1
= e, so Ω (1) = ∞ and lim∞Ω (β) = 0. Moreover, 2/β is decreasing and
d
(
β
β−1
)β−1
/dβ =
(
β
β−1
)β−1 (− 1β + ln ββ−1) which is positive since ln (β/ (β − 1)) > 1/β by the
logarithm inequality, so Ω (β) is decreasing over this range.
Moreover if product market competition has the form of homogeneous goods oligopoly with
constant unit cost and ρ−convex demand (ρ > −1), then CSM/piM ≥ 1/ (1 + ρ) (Anderson and
Renault [1], Proposition 3). Therefore, for a given β (47) holds if demand is suﬃciently convex
(ρ < (1/Ω (β)) − 1). This requirement is satisﬁed for instance by the constant elasticity inverse
demand function P = AQ−α, α ∈ (0, (1/Ω (β))− 1) (for β ≥ 2), by the linear inverse demand
function P = A−BQ (for β ≥ 3.14), and in the limit as β →∞ it is satisﬁed by any quasiconvex
demand. 
A.7 Endogenous entry barrier
In stage 3', the imitator payoﬀ depends on the cost-raising eﬀort ρ:
F (Yi;K) =
(
piD
r − αYi −K0 − f (ρ)
)(
Yt
Yi
)β
. (48)
The optimal standalone imitator threshold is YF (ρ) = β (r − α) (K0 + f (ρ)) / ((β − 1)piD), yield-
ing an optimal choice Y ∗F (ρ) = max {Yi, YF (ρ)}. In stage 2', an innovator having entered at the
threshold Yi chooses a level of eﬀort that maximizes:
Le (Yi, ρ) =
(
piM
r − αYi − I0 − ρ
)
+
piD − piM
r − α Y
∗
F (ρ)
(
Yi
Y ∗F (ρ)
)β
. (49)
Note that term Y ∗F (ρ) generally introduces a kink in the innovator's stage 2' payoﬀ. For example
with K0 ≤ ((β − 1) /β) (piD/piM ) I0, YF (0) ≤ YNPV so that Y ∗F (ρ) = Yi in both in attrition and
preemption regimes for some range of eﬀort ρ ∈ [0, ρ]. In such cases the innovator's stage 2' decision
problem may present a corner solution. Moreover in an attrition regime, since the innovator thresh-
old is random, the optimal endogenous entry barrier is itself a random variable in stage 1'. How-
ever, to determine the critical imitation cost K̂e that separates the two regimes, it is suﬃcient to
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consider the case in which innovator entry occurs at the threshold at which there are no positional
rents, i.e. YL,e (ρ
∗) = β (r − α) (I0 + ρ∗) / ((β − 1)piM ) where ρ∗ solves maxρ Le (YL,e, ρ) such that
Le (YL,e, ρ
∗) = F
(
YF ; K̂e
)
. Since atK = K̂,
(
Yt
YL,e(ρ∗)
)β
Le (YL,e (ρ
∗) , ρ∗) ≥
(
Yt
YL
)β
Le (YL,e (ρ
∗) , 0) =
L (YL, YF ) = F
(
YF ; K̂
)
, it immediately follows that K̂e = K0 + f (ρ
∗) ≤ K̂. 
A.8 Buyout and licensing
Depending on the eﬀect of entry on industry proﬁt, there are two cases to consider.
Case i: eﬃciency eﬀect (piM/piD ≥ 2)
Suppose that the innovator, at the time of investment, can oﬀer a payment of ϕ to buy its rival's
option on duopoly proﬁts. The innovator's decision in stage 2 in this case is maxϕ≥F0(Yi) Lb (Yi, ϕ)
where
Lb (Yi, ϕ) :=
(
piM
r − αYi − I − ϕ
)(
Yt
Yi
)β
(50)
and ϕ ≥ F0(Yi) is the rival ﬁrm's participation constraint. As imitator entry reduces industry
ﬂow proﬁt, a takeover is always eﬃcient for the ﬁrms and it is straightforward to verify that at an
optimum Lb (Yi, F0(Yi)) > L (Yi, Y
∗
F ).
To establish that a buyout can increase welfare, consider the case where imitator entry would
leave the consumer surplus unchanged, as occurs if 2piD = piM (i.e., a unit demand or a cartel
in a homogeneous product market). If K ≥ K̂, preemption occurs, and industry value is pegged
to F0(Yt) regardless of whether takeovers are allowed or not. A buyout is eﬃcient in this case
if the ﬁrst ﬁrm enters earlier. This occurs when the innovator can make a purchase oﬀer to its
rival, i.e. if the lower root of Lb (Yi, F0(Yi)) = F (YF ;K) is lower than YP , which holds since
Lb (Yi, F0(Yi)) > L (Yi, Y
∗
F ).
To establish that attrition can be eliminated, consider the limiting case K = 0. In this case,
follower entry is immediate for all Yi, so F0(Yi) = piDYi/ (r − α) and the stage 1 leader payoﬀ is
therefore
Lb (Yi, F0(Yi)) :=
(
piM − piD
r − α Yi − I
)(
Yt
Yi
)β
. (51)
Let Yb := β (r − α) I/ ((β − 1) (piM − piD)) denote the maximum of the latter function. Solving
Lb(Yb, F0(Yb)) ≥ F0(Yb)(Yt/Yb)β gives the condition under which preemption arises even with a
maximal second mover advantage (K = 0) as piM/piD ≥ β + 1.
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If a buyout is not possible then the innovator may license its technology to the imitator when
it enters. The innovator's decision in stage 2 takes the form maxϕ≤KI Vl (ϕ) where
Vl (ϕ) =
(
ϕ− piM − piD
r − α Y
∗
F (ϕ)
)(
Yt
Y ∗F (ϕ)
)β
(52)
and the rival's participation constraint is F (Y ∗F ;K0 + ϕ) ≥ F0(Y ∗F ). In (52), Y ∗F (ϕ) is the follower's
investment threshold is generally a function of the fee ϕ (if ϕ < KI), although at an optimum
ϕ∗ = KI and Y ∗F (ϕ) = Y
∗
F . In stage 1 then, the leader value is
Ll (Yi, Y
∗
F ) :=
(
piM
r − αYi − I
)(
Yt
Yi
)β
+
(
piD − piM
r − α Y
∗
F +KI
)(
Yt
Y ∗F
)β
(53)
so licensing simply has a level eﬀect on the leader payoﬀ if Yi < YF . Setting Ll (YL, YF ) =
F (YF ;K) deﬁnes the critical threshold K̂l < K̂ that separates the attrition and preemption
regimes. To establish the eﬀect of licensing on welfare, there are three cases to consider: 1) If
K ≥ K̂, the industry is preemptive whether licensing occurs or not. Industry value and the timing
of imitation are then unaﬀected by licensing, whereas the preemption threshold decreases since
Ll (Yi, Y
∗
F ) > L (Yi, Y
∗
F ) so innovation occurs earlier and welfare increases. 2) Alternatively, if
K ∈
(
K̂l, K̂
)
, then the industry switches from an attrition regime to preemption when licensing
is allowed. As compared with the previous case, the increase in welfare is also due to an increase in
industry value and earlier imitation. 3) Finally, if K ≤ K̂l, the industry is in an attrition regime
whether licensing occurs or not. Industry value is pegged on the optimal leader value, which
increases in comparison to the baseline model, and the imitation is either unaﬀected (if Y˜I ≤ YF )
or occurs earlier if innovation occurs earlier. What remains to be veriﬁed is that the distribution
of innovation thresholds shifts left with licensing. We do this in the case that K is not too small,
K˜l < K ≤ K̂l, (the argument for K ≤ K˜l is similar).
Note ﬁrst that the support of the mixed strategy distribution,
[
YL, YS′,l
] ∪ [YS,l,∞), is larger
with licensing. YL is unaﬀected by licensing, whereas YS,l = β (r − α) (I −KI) / ((β − 1)piD) <
YS . Finally, for Yi < YF licensing shifts L (Yi, YF ) upward by KI (Yt/YF )
β , which is weakly larger
than the upward shifts of M (Yi) (KI (Yt/Yi)
β), so YS′,l > YS′ (see the graphic construction of YS′
in Figure 2 ).
Next, it is necessary to examine the impact of licensing on the hazard rate of Y˜I . Over [YS ,∞),
the hazard rate implied by (19), adapted to the licensing speciﬁcation, becomes
h0,l (Yi;K0 + ϕ
∗) = β
I −KI
I −KI −K
(
1
YS,l
− 1
Yi
)
. (54)
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Comparing with h0 in (29), we ﬁnd
h0,l (Yi;K0 + ϕ
∗)
h0 (Yi;K)
=
(I −KI) (I −K)
I (I −KI −K)
1
YS,l
− 1Yi
1
YS
− 1Yi
> 1. (55)
Over [YL, YS′), the hazard rate implied by (21), adapted to licensing, becomes
hl (Yi;K0) =
−∂Ll(Yi)/∂Yi
F
(
Y ∗F ;K
)− Ll(Yi) (56)
and since the slope of Ll is independent of ϕ so that licensing only has a positive level eﬀect,
hl (Yi;K0) > h (Yi;K).
Case ii: product market complementarity (piM/piD < 2)
If the second ﬁrm's entry increases industry proﬁt, there is an optimal imitator entry threshold
for the industry Y ∗∗F := β (r − α)K0/ (β − 1) (2piD − piM ), which may be either greater or smaller
than YF as noted in the text. With a simple ﬂat license fee instrument an innovator cannot
induce imitation beyond YF (it could with a forcing contract or a combination of a ﬂat fee and a
royalty payment but we do not pursue this further here) so the most interesting case to consider
is if imitation occurs too late from an industry standpoint and the innovator has some leeway
regarding imitator entry i.e. Yi, Y
∗∗
F < YF . Otherwise, the optimal license fee is KI , imitation
occurs at Y ∗F , and the outcome is comparable to the previous case. If these inequalities do hold,
then in stage 2, the innovator's problem with the forcing contract is maxϕ≤KI Vl (ϕ) where
Vl (ϕ) =
(
ϕ− piM − piD
r − α Y
∗∗
F
)(
Yt
Y ∗∗F
)β
(57)
and the follower's participation constraint is F (Y ∗∗F ;K0 + ϕ) ≥ F0(Y ∗∗F ). An optimal license fee
satisﬁes this constraint with equality, i.e. at the optimal imitation threshold Y ∗∗F ,
piD
r − αY
∗∗
F −K0 − ϕ∗ =
(
piD
r − αYF −K0 −KI
)(
Y ∗∗F
YF
)β
(58)
whereas if ϕ = KI ,
piD
r − αY
∗∗
F −K0 − ϕ <
(
piD
r − αYF −K0 −KI
)(
Y ∗∗F
YF
)β
so ϕ∗ < KI if Y ∗∗F < YF . 
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YL
F (Yi;K)
L(Yi, YF ) M(Yi)
YF YS
E(Vi)
F (YF ;K)
Figure 1: Attrition regime, K ∈
[
0, K˜
)
. YS is a global maximum of the leader payoﬀ, innovator
entry thresholds are distributed over [YS ,∞), and imitator entry occurs immediately after. Note
that if K < Kl, then YF < YL.
YL
F (Yi;K)
L(Yi, YF )
M(Yi)
YFYS′ YS
F (YF ;K)
E(Vi)
Figure 2: Attrition regime, K ∈
[
K˜, K̂
)
. The leader payoﬀ has two local maxima (YL, YS),
innovator entry thresholds are distributed over [YL, YS′ ]∪ [YS ,∞), and imitator entry occurs either
at YF (if min
{
Y˜i, Y˜j
}
∈ [YL, YS′ ]) or immediately otherwise (if min
{
Y˜i, Y˜j
}
∈ [YS ,∞)).
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YL
E(Vi)
F (Yi;K)
L(Yi, YF )
M(Yi)
YF
Figure 3: Critical case, K = K̂. The innovator and imitator enter at YL and YF respectively.
YL
E(Vi) F (Yi;K)
L(Yi, YF )
M(Yi)
YFYP YP ′
Figure 4: Preemption regime, K ∈
(
K̂, I
)
. The innovator enters at YP and the imitator at YF .
There is war of attrition oﬀ the equilibrium path (over (YP ′ ,∞)).
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YL
E(Vi)
F (Yi;K)
L(YL, YF )
L(Yi, YF )
YFYP
Figure 5: Preemption regime, K ∈ [I,∞). The innovator enters at YP and the imitator at
YF . Note that the dotted curve represents F (Yi;K) whreas the corresponding solid curve is the
concentrated follower payoﬀ F (Y ∗F ;K).
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B Supplementary section (for refereeing)
This section details intermediate steps of some of the lengthier derivations in the appendix.
B.1 Derivation of K̂, K˜, and Kl ≤ K˜ ≤ K̂ ranking
To ﬁnd K̂, set L (YL, YF ) = F
(
YF ; K̂
)
i.e.(
piM
r − αYL − I
)(
Yt
YL
)β
+
piD − piM
r − α YF
(
Yt
YF
)β
=
(
piD
r − αYF − K̂
)(
Yt
YF
)β
(59)
or, substituting for YL and ŶF = β (r − α) K̂/ (β − 1)piD (at K = K̂)
I
β − 1
(
Yt
YL
)β
+
β
β − 1
(
1− piM
piD
)
K̂
(
Yt
ŶF
)β
=
K̂
β − 1
(
Yt
ŶF
)β
. (60)
Then multiply by
(
ŶF /Yt
)β
and note that ŶF /YL = (piM/piD)
(
K̂/I
)
to get
I
β − 1
(
piM
piD
)β (K̂
I
)β
+
β
β − 1
(
1− piM
piD
)
K̂ =
K̂
β − 1 . (61)
Multiplying by (β − 1) /K̂ and regrouping terms,(
piM
piD
)β (K̂
I
)β−1
= 1 + β
(
piM
piD
− 1
)
(62)
so
K̂ =
(
(1 + β ((piM/piD)− 1)) / (piM/piD)β
)1/(β−1)
I. (63)
To ﬁnd K˜, set L (YL, YF ) = M (YS) i.e.(
piM
r − αYL − I
)(
Yt
YL
)β
+
piD − piM
r − α YF
(
Yt
YF
)β
=
(
piD
r − αYS − I
)(
Yt
YS
)β
. (64)
Substituting for YL, YF , and YS gives
I
β − 1
(
Yt
YL
)β
+
β
β − 1
(
1− piM
piD
)
K˜
(
Yt
YF
)β
=
I
β − 1
(
Yt
YS
)β
. (65)
Multiply by (YF /Yt)
β and note that YF /YL = (piM/piD)
(
K˜/I
)
and YF /YS = K˜/I to get
I
β − 1
(
piM
piD
)β (K˜
I
)β
+
β
β − 1
(
1− piM
piD
)
K˜ =
I
β − 1
(
K˜
I
)β
. (66)
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Regrouping terms on either side,
I
β − 1
((
piM
piD
)β
− 1
)(
K˜
I
)β
=
β
β − 1
(
piM
piD
− 1
)
K˜ (67)
and multiplying by (β − 1) /K˜,((
piM
piD
)β
− 1
)(
K˜
I
)β−1
= β
(
piM
piD
− 1
)
(68)
so
K˜ =
(
β ((piM/piD)− 1) /
(
(piM/piD)
β − 1
))1/(β−1)
I. (69)
The diﬀerent critical imitation cost levels are ranked as Kl ≤ K˜ ≤ K̂, with strict inequalities
if piM > piD. Indeed, straightforward calculations show that K˜ ≥ Kl if and only if
(β − 1) (piM/piD)β − β (piM/piD)β−1 + 1 ≥ 0, (70)
and that K̂ ≥ K˜ if and only if
(piM/piD)
β − β ((piM/piD)− 1)− 1 ≥ 0. (71)
Both of these conditions hold for all β, piM/piD ≥ 1 (it suﬃces to evaluate them at piM/piD = 1
and to observe that the derivative with respect to piM/piD is non-negative).
B.2 Welfare under preemption
Characterization of YP (K)
Over
(
K̂,∞
)
the condition L (YP , YF ) = F (YF ;K) implicitly deﬁnes the preemption thresh-
old YP as a C1 function of K (see Section A.2):(
piM
r − αYP − I
)(
Yt
YP
)β
+
piD − piM
r − α YF
(
Yt
YF
)β
=
(
piD
r − αYF −K
)(
Yt
YF
)β
. (72)
Dividing by Y βt and moving YF terms to the right-hand side gives(
piM
r − αYP − I
)
Y −βP =
(
piM
r − αYF −K
)
Y −βF (73)
or, substituting (β (r − α)K) / ((β − 1)piD) for YF and factoring K1−β ,(
piM
r − αYP − I
)
Y −βP =
(
β
β − 1
piM
piD
− 1
)(
β
β − 1
r − α
piD
)−β
K1−β . (74)
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The condition (74) has the form f (YP ) = g (K) and thus deﬁnes dYP /dK = g
′(K)/f ′(YP ) where
f ′ (YP ) =
(
− (β − 1) piM
r − αYP + βI
)
Y −β−1P (75)
and
g′ (K) = − (β − 1)
(
β
β − 1
piM
piD
− 1
)(
β
β − 1
r − α
piD
)−β
K−β = −β − 1
K
g (K) . (76)
The sign g′ (K) < 0 is direct whereas for any preemption threshold YP , YP < YL, and therefore
f ′ (YP ) > 0. Finally note that from (75) and (76), using the identity f (YP ) = g(K) and simplifying
the numerator and the denominator by Y −βP ,
dYP
dK
= −β − 1
K
piM
r−αYP − I
− (β − 1) piMr−α + β (I/YP )
. (77)
Interior preemption optimum KP
Suppose that condition (33) holds so that the preemption optimum is interior. In a preemption
equilibrium innovator and imitator entry occur at YP and YF so social welfare is
W (K) =
(
CSM + piM
r − α YP − I
)(
Yt
YP
)β
+
(
(CSD + 2piD)− (CSM + piM )
r − α YF −K
)(
Yt
YF
)β
.
(78)
Substituting for YF in the second term and factoring K,
W (K) =
(
CSM + piM
r − α YP − I
)(
Yt
YP
)β
+
(
β
β − 1
(CSD + 2piD)− (CSM + piM )
piD
− 1
)(
β
β − 1
r − α
piD
)−β
Y βt K
1−β . (79)
In a constrained social optimum the planner's problem over the preemption range is max
K≥K̂W (K).
The derivative of (79) is
W ′ (K) =
(
− (β − 1) CSM + piM
r − α YP + βI
)(
Yt
YP
)β 1
YP
dYP
dK
− (β − 1)
(
β
β − 1
(CSD + 2piD)− (CSM + piM )
piD
− 1
)(
β
β − 1
r − α
piD
)−β
Y βt K
−β .
At an interior optimum the socially optimal imitation cost KP satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition
W ′P (KP ) = 0, but it is more convenient to obtain an expression for the corresponding socially opti-
mal preemption threshold Y ∗P from the ﬁrst-order condition. Substituting for dYP /dK (expression
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(77)) in the ﬁrst-order condition and multiplying by K/
(
(β − 1)Y βt
)
gives
−
(
− (β − 1) CSM+piMr−α Y ∗P + βI
)(
piM
r−αY
∗
P − I
)
− (β − 1) piMr−αY ∗P + βI
Y ∗−βP
−
(
β
β − 1
(CSD + 2piD)− (CSM + piM )
piD
− 1
)(
β
β − 1
r − α
piD
)−β
K∗1−β = 0. (81)
From the preemption condition (74),
(
β
β − 1
r − α
piD
)−β
K1−β =
(
piM
r−αY
∗
P − I
)
Y −βP
β
β−1
piM
piD
− 1 . (82)
Substituting into the second term in (81), cancelling
(
piM
r−αY
∗
P − I
)
Y ∗−βP terms which appear in
both parts, and rearranging yields an equivalent condition in terms of Y ∗P only,
(β − 1) CSM+piMr−α Y ∗P − βI
− (β − 1) piMr−αY ∗P + βI
=
β
β−1
(CSD+2piD)−(CSM+piM )
piD
− 1
β
β−1
piM
piD
− 1 . (83)
There is a unique solution to (83) which can be expressed as Y ∗P = ψYL = ψ (β (r − α) I) / ((β − 1)piM ),
in which case the numerator and denominator of the left hand side simplify yielding, after rear-
rangement of the right-hand side also,
CSM+piM
piM
ψ − 1
1− ψ =
(CSD+2piD)−(CSM+piM )
piD
− β−1β
piM
piD
− β−1β
(84)
and it is straightforward to check that the unique solution is
ψ =
CSD−CSM
piD
+ 2β
CSD
piD
− β−1β CSMpiM + 2β
. (85)
Note that setting Y ∗P > YNPV is equivalent to setting ψ > (β − 1) /β and yields condition (33) in
the text.
It is now possible to return to the social welfare expression (79) and obtain an explicit form
for the value of social welfare at the optimum. First, the identity (82) can be used to substitute
terms in the second summand of W (KP ) so as to obtain an expression in terms of Y
∗
P only,
WP (Y
∗
P ) =
(
CSM + piM
r − α Y
∗
P − I
)(
Yt
Y ∗P
)β
+
(
β
β − 1
(CSD + 2piD)− (CSM + piM )
piD
− 1
) piM
r−αY
∗
P − I
β
β−1
piM
piD
− 1
(
Yt
Y ∗P
)β
.
(86)
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Regrouping terms
WP (Y
∗
P ) =
(
CSM+piM
r−α Y
∗
P − I
)(
β
β−1
piM
piD
− 1
)
+
(
β
β−1
(CSD+2piD)−(CSM+piM )
piD
− 1
)(
piM
r−αY
∗
P − I
)
β
β−1
piM
piD
− 1
(
Yt
Y ∗P
)β
.
(87)
Substituting for Y ∗P = (β (r − α)ψI) / ((β − 1)piM ) (= ψYL) and factoring I,
WP (Y
∗
P ) =
(
β
β−1
CSM+piM
piM
ψ − 1
)(
β
β−1
piM
piD
− 1
)
+
(
β
β−1
(CSD+2piD)−(CSM+piM )
piD
− 1
)(
β
β−1ψ − 1
)
β
β−1
piM
piD
− 1 ψ
−βI
(
Yt
YL
)β
.
(88)
It is straightforward to check that after substituting the expression for ψ given by (85) and some
algebra,
WP (Y
∗
P ) =
CSM
piM
ψ1−β
1− ψ
I
β − 1
(
Yt
YL
)β
. (89)

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